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ABSTRACT 
 
LISA MALI JONES: An Examination of Social Influence Effects on Commitment to Change 
and Implementation Behaviors 
(Under the direction of David A. Hofmann) 
 
Planned organizational changes can be expensive and difficult to implement.  
Research suggests that implementation failure occurs when managers do not gain their 
employees’ skilled, consistent, and committed program (or product) use (Klein, Conn, & 
Sorra, 2001).  This definition highlights the need to understand commitment to change and 
the implementation stage of organizational change.  The purpose of this dissertation is to 
investigate attitudinal and behavioral responses to an organizational change by specifying 
how employee-generated reasons, and dyadic influence mechanisms, relate to employee 
commitment to change.  Two theories are used to understand the processes employees go 
through in deciding to support and implement a change.  First, Behavioral Reasons Theory 
(Westaby, 2002, 2005) identifies the reasons people consider when deciding to support or 
resist a change—and I extend this theory by suggesting that reasons may have organizing 
categories.  Second, I build upon social information processing theory (Salancik & Pfeffer, 
1978) to suggest that people emphasize different reasons for and against supporting a change 
after interacting with different network partners.  I then argue that employee commitment to 
change is in part due to the reasons employees adopt from influential network partners at 
work.    I close by further validating that certain types of commitment to change (affective, 
normative, and continuance) relate to certain implementation behaviors. 
iv 
 
Findings indicated and that employee ratings of reasons were subject to influence 
effects over time (even controlling for original ratings).  This was true in the case of reasons 
related to resource issues and reasons related to the opinions of others.  Findings also indicate 
a significant effect for relationship symmetry and the closeness of reason ratings over time, 
again for two types of reasons.  Also, there was evidence that reasons may be organized by 
categories, and that certain categories relate to different types of commitment to change.  
Lastly, regression results indicated that two of the three types of commitment to change 
related to behavioral outcomes, specifically cooperation and championing behaviors.   
This work helps researchers understand more about the social-contextual factors 
related to organizational change and it can help practitioners intervene in facilitating the 
implementation of organizational change initiatives. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 Introduction 
Planned organizational changes—whether in the form of new products, new 
processes, or the mandate to innovate for new markets—can be expensive and difficult to 
implement.  The history of organizational change efforts suggests that many innovative 
products, practices, and services fail to deliver expected results (2001; Orlikowski, 2000; 
Pfeffer & Sutton, 2000; White, 1996)).  A growing body of research suggests that such 
disappointments may be the result of implementation failure, rather than a result of program 
or technical failure (Klein et al., 2001; Repenning, 2002). Implementation failure occurs 
when organizations “fail to gain employees’ skilled, consistent, and committed program (or 
product) use” (Klein et al., 2001).  When this occurs, the change initiative fails to produce 
expected results.  A decade ago, Dean and Bowen (1994) evaluated one type of change 
initiative, total quality management, and noted that little theory exists to explain the 
difference between successful and unsuccessful implementation efforts.  Since that time, the 
literature on implementation has grown to contain a large number of case studies (Klein & 
Sorra, 1996), yet empirical fieldwork and theoretical research on the subject is still lacking.  
Thus, the need to expand our understanding of the implementation stage of organizational 
change efforts remains critical.   
One way to do this is to focus on the commitment component of the definition of 
implementation and to work from the commitment construct to understand the antecedents 
to—and the implementation consequences of—commitment to change.  One approach to 
2evaluating commitment to change is to consider it as part of a sensemaking process whereby 
individuals evaluate reasons for and against supporting a change and then use social 
information to judge and act on those reasons.  Thus, one can study the phenomenon of 
commitment to change by selecting an organizational change and 1) identifying the 
individual-level reasons people have for and against supporting the initiative; 2) identifying 
how social network ties and communication patterns affect these reasons; and 3) relating the 
reasons and the network information to both commitment and implementation behaviors.   
In this research, I utilize this approach and focus on how reasons for and against 
supporting an organizational change affect commitment to the change and change-related 
behaviors—in particular as a result of social interactions.  I draw from behavioral reasons 
theory (BRT) (Westaby, 2005; Westaby & Fishbein, 1996; Westaby, Fishbein, & Aherin, 
1997), social network theory (Burt, 1987), social information processing theory (Salancik & 
Pfeffer, 1978), and the commitment to change literature (Herscovitch & Meyer, 2002) to 
suggest that implementation success stems from the commitment people feel (or do not feel) 
toward the change, which may be a result of the types of reasons influential people use in 
describing and supporting the change.  In so doing, I do the following: 1) outline a 
sensemaking process clarifying how and why reasons may “travel” differently through an 
organization based on communication flows at work; 2)  address the question of whether 
reasons change over time; and 3) suggest that commitment to change may mediate the 
relationship between reasons and implementation behaviors.   
Little research to date has examined commitment to change in relation to 
implementation behaviors, and no research of which I am aware links reasons and social 
networks to commitment and implementation.  Therefore, this work makes several 
3contributions to the study of organizational behavior and the study of organizational change 
in that it further investigates the social influence effects of network partners on change-
related cognitions and behaviors; it links commitment to change to a neglected variable, 
implementation behavior; and it suggests that commitment to change can mediate the 
relationship between reasons and implementation. 
In order to make these contributions, I first discuss the sensemaking and social 
information processing literatures to clarify the role of social comparisons and network 
interactions during times of change.  With this background, I offer a model that outlines how 
individuals might respond to a change initiative—and how these responses may change over 
time as a result of comparing responses with others in the social environment.  In order to 
support the model, I introduce behavioral reasons theory (Westaby, 2002; Westaby et al., 
1996; Westaby et al., 1997) and then argue that the movement of specific reasons through a 
social system can be traced over time.  After making this claim, I discuss commitment to 
change and suggest that individual commitment to change might differ depending upon 
which reasons are favored.  Lastly, I outline the implementation literature, and identify how 
different types of commitment to change may relate to different implementation behaviors.  I 
close with results and directions for future research.   
Figure 1.0 below outlines the general approach of this paper and identifies which 
elements of commitment to change and implementation will be discussed. Subsequent figures 
specify in greater detail the proposed influence process within workplace networks. 
4Figure 1.0: 
Organizing Framework Relating Reasons For and Against a Change to Networks, 
Commitment, and Implementation 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
Sensemaking and Social Information Processing In Relation to Organizational Change 
 
Considerable research indicates that during times of uncertainty (such as during an 
organizational change) individuals look to others in their social environment for information 
on how to resolve that uncertainty (Ibarra & Andrews, 1993; Meyer, 1994; Rice & Aydin, 
1991a).  In particular, research on sensemaking and social information processing has 
established these tendencies.  This chapter briefly introduces both literatures in order to 
establish why and how social comparison behaviors exist during times of organizational 
change.   
 Sensemaking refers to the process where organizational members translate an event 
into a meaningful explanation for that event (Gioia & Sims, 1986).  More specifically, the 
sensemaking perspective focuses on the development of meanings and how they motivate 
action (Drazin, Glynn, & Kazanjian, 1999).  Organizational members do not simply behave 
and do work, they also order and make sense of their world (Gioia & Sims, 1986; Greenberg, 
1995).  Weick (1979; Weick & Roberts, 1993) suggests that people create meanings about 
their social setting through interactions with others.  When the social system receives a 
shock, such as with the introduction of a change initiative, people’s habitual responses and 
interpretations may no longer be appropriate.  In such situations, organizational members 
may need to create new or revised schemes that make sense within the context of the 
organizational change (Bartunek, 1984).   
6Often, the sensemaking process can involve the entire social network, because 
individuals look to a variety of others to compare reactions to change.  Such social 
comparisons are central to the sensemaking process, and social information processing theory 
(Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978) provides the theoretical background to explain why comparison is 
part of post-change sensemaking.    
Social information processing theory posits that people within organizations use 
information from others in order to form opinions about the organization and about 
appropriate behavior.  More specifically, social information processing theory suggests that 
individual opinions about the merits of a particular change come from personal assessments 
of the change, as well as from evaluations and acceptance of the subjective reactions of 
coworkers. Timing is critical in social information processing theory, as social information 
plays a particularly important role in shaping perceptions under conditions of ambiguity or 
extreme uncertainty (such as during the introduction/sensemaking stage of an organizational 
change).  During times of ambiguity and uncertainty people look to others for cues and 
interpretations (Festinger, 1954).  In particular, social comparison theory (Festinger, 1954) 
states that when personal and objective standards do not exist (as often is the case with a new 
change effort), people are more likely to socially compare with both similar and dissimilar 
others.   
Several studies have demonstrated that social information processing affects job 
perceptions or job attitudes (Dean et al., 1994; Dean & Brass, 1985; Rice et al., 1991a).  For 
example, employees in a group show greater congruence in perceptions as their interaction 
with coworkers increases (Dean & Brass, 1985).  Other work in the social influence tradition 
has moved from measuring perceptions and/or similarity of perceptions to measuring 
7similarity in attitudes.  Some of the attitudes that have been measured are attitudes about 
computer use (Venkatesh & Davis, 2000), self-efficacy (Burkhardt, 1994) or system worth 
(Rice, 1993; Rice et al., 1991a; Rice, Grant, Schmitz, & Torobin, 1990). For example, Rice 
and Aydin (1991) studied departmental responses to a new health information system, and 
they derived a mean attitude component from responses to three questions about a computer 
system and 1) whether it was worth the time to use, 2) the extent to which the computer 
system had changed the ease of performing work, and 3) about the quality of the work after 
using the system.  These researchers used tenets of network theory in order to specify which 
people would have the strongest effects on attitudes.  They also attempted to specify the 
relative importance of “source others” by having respondents rate how important they found 
the opinions of supervisors and coworkers, respectively.   
Rice and Aydin (1991) discovered that: 1) social information processing influences 
respondent attitudes toward a new system over and above traditional sources (such as use of 
the system or occupational membership); 2) there was greater influence from relational and 
positional sources of information than from spatially proximal sources (i.e. friends and 
bosses rather than seat-mates); 3) the primary sources of social information are those with 
whom one communicates freely and one’s supervisor; and 4) weighting of others’ attitude by 
how important the respondent rates the others’ opinion is necessary in several situations.  
This study and others (Meyer, 1994; Rice, 1993; Salancik et al., 1978) lend support to 
the idea that an individual’s attitudes and beliefs are partially formed as a result of the 
attitudes and beliefs of surrounding others through mechanisms of social comparison and 
social information processing.  Overall, the sensemaking and social information processing 
literatures suggest that, particularly in times of uncertainty at work, people look to others for 
8standards and guidance on how to think and behave.  I argue that this claim can be tested in a 
very specific context—namely, the theories can be used as background in studying 
antecedents to commitment to change and to change implementation behaviors.  No research 
of which I am aware has investigated these variables in this context.   
In the following chapters, I build upon the idea that when employees hear about a 
significant and controversial organizational change, they form initial reactions while also 
looking to others to determine their ultimate attitudes and behaviors.  I suggest that a key 
area of comparison regards the different reasons for and against supporting the change.  As 
outlined in Figure 2 below, I argue that in selecting their reaction to an organizational 
change, an individual determines who is most powerful and influential in the context of the 
change. Over time, I argue that an individual adopts the reasons of this influential person.  
Additionally, I suggest that different types of reasons lead to particular types of commitment 
to change and to particular implementation behaviors.   
Figure 2.0 below outlines a model of how the influence process may work in the 
context of measuring commitment to change and change implementation behaviors.   
The following chapter develops this model by introducing Behavioral Reasons 
Theory (Westaby, 2002, 2005; Westaby et al., 1996; Westaby et al., 1997; Westaby & 
Marsick, 2005) in order to establish the role of employee-generated reasons for and against 
supporting a change as a key element of the social comparison and sensemaking that occurs 
after the introduction of an organizational change. 
Figure 2.0:
Process Model of Dyadic Influence, Commitment to Change, and Change Implementation
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
Individual Reactions to Change in the Form of Reasons: The Role of Behavioral 
Reasons Theory 
 
“The reasons motivating organizational change, both real and perceived, 
have received relatively little attention in research on the implementation of 
complex organizational interventions” (Rousseau & Tijoriwala, 1999: 517) 
In the context of studying planned organizational changes, there is empirical evidence 
that employee interpretations of the change are critical to understanding employee reactions 
to the change.  Specifically, in studying worker responses to change initiatives, researchers 
have found that employee interpretations of the reasons for a change influence their reactions 
to the change (Shapiro, Buttner, & Barry, 1994).  Research also indicates that not all reasons 
given by managers to explain change are considered credible or acceptable to employees 
(Bies & Shapiro, 1993). Also, the same change initiative can give rise to very different causal 
explanations from the perspective of employees (Rousseau & Tijoriwala, 1999).  In this 
context, researchers have also stated (as in the quote above): “the causal frameworks 
employees use to understand change are not well understood…” (Rousseau & Tijoriwala, 
1999:514).   
Attempts to address this situation have found that employees interpret the reasons an 
organization undertakes change based upon the reasons provided by managers, as well as 
based upon the reasons they generate for themselves (Rousseau & Tijoriwala, 1999).  The 
reasons, excuses, and explanations that managers give are termed “social accounts,” and they 
11 
 
are usually studied in relation to changes that are negative (such as downsizing, job cuts, 
wage freezes, etc.).  When employees seek and generate causal explanations for unusual and 
unexpected events, and when they generate explanations based upon their own experiences 
and cognitive processes (rather than from manager accounts), they are engaged in motivated 
reasoning (Kunda, 1990).   Recent work on employee evaluations of reasons to change 
indicated that both social accounts and motivated reasoning affect employee evaluations of 
whether or not a change is legitimate and functional (Rousseau & Tijoriwala, 1999).  
Specifically, nurses in a hospital undergoing a restructuring were asked to give their opinion 
regarding the reasons for the change (e.g. select from categories related to quality, 
economics, or self-serving reasons) and they were asked to rate these reasons in terms of 
their legitimacy/acceptableness.  When employees rated the managerial social account 
(quality-related reasons for the change) as legitimate, this was considered as support for 
social accounts theory; yet when they found other reasons as legitimate they were acting in 
support of motivated reasoning theory.  The results of the study supported social accounts 
theory, while also providing strong evidence that employees create alternative explanations 
for change.  Importantly, the study also linked legitimacy of reasons to employee-rated 
implementation success.   
This work clearly supports the idea that reasons and justifications matter in evaluating 
a change initiative; and further that employee-generated reasons are as critical as managerial 
social accounts in helping researchers understand employee reactions to change.  The study 
also linked legitimacy of reasons to employee-rated implementation success.  Given the 
importance of reasons in evaluating a change initiative, it makes sense to further investigate 
theories, such as behavioral reasons theory (BRT) (Westaby, 2002; Westaby, 2003; Westaby, 
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2005; Westaby et al., 1997; Westaby et al., 2005), that provide a theoretical link between 
employee-generated reasons and behavioral intentions and outcomes.    
Behavioral Reasons Theory 
Behavioral reasons theory belongs to a general family of theories that examine the 
impact of positive and negative factors on judgments and behavior (e.g. field theory, balance 
theory, the health-belief model).  It builds on behavioral intention theories such as the theory 
of reasoned action (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975) and the theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 
1991) by postulating that reasons for and against a behavior serve as an important link 
between beliefs, “global evaluations” (e.g. attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived 
control), intentions, and behavior.   
More specifically, BRT is a framework that attempts to explain and incorporate the 
specific cognitive factors that motivate and maintain people’s intentions and behaviors.  It 
suggests that understanding the specific reasons people use to explain “why” they form their 
behavioral intentions is necessary to fully understand specific motives (Westaby, 2003; 
Westaby et al., 1996).  The emphasis that BRT places upon the importance of specific beliefs 
(measured as accessible reasons) means that in BRT, accessible reasons are suggested to 
have direct associations with behavioral intentions.  This contrasts with assumptions in the 
theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1991), where the effects of any belief-based components 
are assumed to be mediated through attitude, subjective norm, and perceived control.  
Behavioral reasons theory does not omit or “bypass” these variables, as such “global 
evaluations” are postulated to also mediate the relationship between reasons and 
intentions/behavior, it simply also suggests a direct link from reasons to intentions and 
behavior (see Figure 3.0). 
13 
 
Figure 3.0 
Behavioral Reasons Theory (from Westaby & Marsick, 2005, under review) 
Behavioral reasons theory attempts to describe the role of accessible reasons in 
behavioral decision-making.  In a decision-making framework, the motivational process is 
presumed to begin with a state of uncertainty.  Individuals resolve uncertainty by evaluating 
their positive and negative beliefs associated with the behavior under consideration.  This 
evaluative process results in intentions to perform the behavior and simultaneously results in 
the formation of accessible reasons that can be used to justify and support these intentions.  
Importantly, accessible reasons are assumed to support people’s ongoing pursuit of behavior 
once the behavior is initiated.   
Applications of Behavioral Reasons Theory 
Behavioral reasons theory has been used to improve our understanding of turnover 
decisions and job satisfaction (Westaby, 2003) and implementation behaviors (Westaby et 
al., 2005).  As an improvement on behavioral intention models, behavioral reasons theory 
can also account for behavioral change—and this is critical to understanding how 
commitment types and levels might change in the context of an organizational change effort.  
Specifically, according to the model, people may interrupt their ongoing behavioral pursuits 
Reasons  
(Pro/Con) 
 
Global 
Evaluations 
(Attitude, 
Perceived 
Control, 
Subjective 
Norm) 
Intentions Behavior 
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when new information is presented which causes them to question their current accessible 
reasons.  If their current accessible reasons are not sufficient to counter-argue the newly 
encountered information, then they become uncertain about their intentions and on-going 
behavior.  At this point, the behavioral decision making process would be re-engaged to 
“form a new intention, a new set of accessible reasons, and a new course of committed, 
ongoing action” (Westaby, 2003: G3).  Thus, when a change initiative is introduced and 
discussed, people likely consider or reconsider the reasons that either support or do not 
support endorsing the initiative.  As I discuss later, this consideration likely involves 
watching and interacting with others in order to fully decide how to act. 
As an illustrative example of how accessible reasons theory is operationalized, 
consider examples from a study where BRT was applied to the understanding of turnover 
intentions (Westaby, 2003).  Accessible reasons are defined as the specific factors that 
employees use to explain their turnover intention responses—e.g. an employee could access 
reasons to stay such as “I have good social relationships here” and “I enjoy my job.”  
Employees would also access reasons against staying (such as “My boss does not promote 
people”), and together both types of reasons would affect intentions and behavior.  In 
research, accessible reason variables were related to turnover intention and turnover 
behavior, and they explained an additional 12% of the variance in turnover intentions, after 
controlling for subjective norm, perceived control, and attitude variables (all of which are 
related to the theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1991)).  Accessible reasons also explained 
more variance in longitudinal job satisfaction than that explained by other theories.  Such 
findings suggest the importance of measuring accessible reason variables in behavioral 
15 
 
intention models.  Doing so increases explanatory value while simultaneously highlighting 
specific targets for applied interventions. 
Measuring Behavioral Reasons Theory and Categorizing Reasons 
In the research environment, BRT is assessed by first performing qualitative 
elicitation interviews with organizational representatives in order to capture potential reasons 
for or against a particular behavior.  After salient possible reasons are collected, respondents 
select applicable reasons from two columns (one “for” and one “against”).  Typically, 
reasons in the list deal with a range of issues, such as relationships, other alternatives, and the 
nature of the work itself.  Respondents are also often asked to place an additional mark next 
to very influential reasons (which allows for additional assessment).  However, to date, no 
research using the theory has asked: are there predictable categories of reasons for and 
against an organizational change?  This question is important because if there were 
predictable categories of reasons, then researchers could investigate whether certain reason 
types strongly relate to certain behaviors or attitudes.  This categorization could advance 
investigations of change beyond idiosyncratic studies and move it toward more systematic 
types of research. 
Since no research (of which I am aware) has attempted to categorize reactions to 
change initiatives, there is no a priori set of categories to guide such an exploration.  There 
are, however, several literatures that could inform such an investigation: one option is to look 
at influence attempts (since a change initiative could be classified as in influence attempt); 
another option is to look at the sensemaking and socialization literature (since an 
organizational change is a disruption of routines, it requires sensemaking and perhaps new 
16 
 
socialization on the part of employees).  A third option is to evaluate the social psychological 
literature on persuasion. 
Influence Literature as an Inspiration for Creating Reason for Change Categories  
To date, the empirical study of influence in organizational behavior has been 
dominated by the goal of developing inventories of strategic influence-seeking behaviors.  
For example, Kipnis, Schmidt & Wilkinson (1980) identified an inventory of seven influence 
tactics, which was later modified to nine tactics by Yukl and colleagues (e.g. rational 
persuasion, inspirational appeal, consultation, ingratiation, exchange, personal appeal, 
coalition, legitimating, and pressure (Yukl & Falbe, 1990).  Most studies examine how 
tactical choices vary with situational perceptions (Dillard & Burgoon, 1985), individual 
differences (O'Hair & Cody, 1987), and organizational climate (Cheng, 1983); studies also 
focus on the effects of certain tactics on certain targets.  However, although there are many 
types of influence tactics, researchers do not agree on the range of tactical options available 
to managers and there is inconsistent information about results of using the tactics (Higgins, 
Judge, & Ferris, 2003; Tepper, Eisenbach, Kirby, & Potter, 1998).  Given these limitations, 
some researchers suggest that meta-categories be used to allow a higher level of abstraction 
in analysis (Furst, 2004; Tepper et al., 1998).  The most commonly suggested scheme is that 
of hard, soft, and rational tactics, where influence occurs by force, psychological persuasion, 
or instrumental reasoning, respectively (Kipnis & Schmidt, 1985).  While such meta-
categories may simplify comparative research on influence, such categories do not cleanly 
translate to the reasons literature (e.g. “hard” versus “soft” reasons are not as intuitive as 
“hard” vs. “soft” tactics; and force-related reasons seem less common than force-related 
tactics).  However, preserving this distinction between psychological persuasion and 
17 
 
instrumental reasoning remains intuitively appealing.  One can both preserve that distinction 
and improve upon the distinction by evaluating the socialization literature for its 
contributions.  
Socialization Literature as an Inspiration for Creating Reason for Change Categories 
The socialization literature suggests that employees who are in a time of transition—
either at organizational entry or during a period of organizational change (Schein & 
Diamante, 1988)—seek five types of information: technical, referent, normative, 
performance, and social (Morrison, 1993).  More specifically, technical information refers to 
how to perform required tasks; referent information refers to role demands and expectations; 
normative information regards adapting to the culture and getting integrated into a work 
group; performance information regards feedback on specific behaviors; and social 
information regards feedback on the acceptability of non-task behaviors.  Attempts to put 
these informational needs into meta-categories suggest that people seek job-relevant 
information (informational) and organizational socialization-relevant information 
(normative) (Morrison, 1993; Shah, 1998).  Thus, there are two major types of employee 
information-seeking that occur along with socialization. This two-part categorization is 
parsimonious and easily lends itself to application in the reasons and justifications literature 
(e.g. it can appear logical to suggest that people use informational and normative reasons to 
support or resist a change).  Also, this choice to draw from the socialization literature to 
understand employee reactions to a change is supported by the literature itself, as researchers 
in that field suggest that socialization-related issues do not just occur at organizational entry, 
but at “several times during the managerial career” (Schein, 1988:53).  Potentially, the same 
18 
 
type of confusion and need for sensemaking that occurs at organizational entry can occur 
with an organizational change (Schein, 1988). 
Interestingly, these meta-categories as used in the socialization literature overlap 
considerably with categories utilized in social psychological studies of persuasion and social 
influence.  Specifically, the field of social psychology has used, as its “central organizing 
framework” (Wood, 2000), the assumption that people agree with others from an 
informational motivation and/or from a normative motivation—e.g. because they want to 
understand the entity or issue featured in the appeals and/or because they want to conform to 
the expectations of another.   Given the above information about the use of these two 
categories as guiding categories in social psychology, and given the parsimony that can come 
from integrating disciplines, I suggest that categories and meta-categories of information-
seeking behaviors can also be applied in evaluating and categorizing reasons and 
justifications.    
Making this application can be done with very few changes to the definitions as used 
in socialization literature.  In taking the categories and applying them to behavioral reasons 
theory, I argue that the definitions can be adjusted according to the list in Table 3.0 below.  
Also, while I maintain that each of the five types of organizational information types from 
socialization also correspond to five types of reason categories, I still suggest that each of 
these original categories would likely be related to second order higher factors that represent 
the two metacategories (informational and normative) described earlier.  The table below 
captures the original definition of each information type, its adjusted definition, and its 
position relative to the two metacategories. 
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Table 3.0 
Categories of Information-Gathering: Adjustments from the Socialization Literature to 
the Reasons Literature 
 
Type of 
Information 
Gathering: 
Category Name 
Original Definition 
in Socialization 
Literature 
Adjusted Definition 
in Context of 
Organizational 
Change 
Meta-Category  
(Normative= culture/ 
socialization relevant;  
Informational=job/task 
relevant) 
Technical 
 
Information on how 
to perform required 
tasks 
Why employees 
would be required to 
perform the change 
Informational 
Role Referent Refers to 
information on 
expectations of 
others related to 
role demands 
Why and how 
change fits with role 
demands and 
expectations 
Informational 
Normative Adapting to the 
culture and getting 
integrated into a 
work group 
Why change 
facilitates cultural 
and work group 
integration; why it is 
expected  
Normative 
Performance 
 
Feedback on 
specific behaviors; 
helps evaluate job 
progress  
Why and how 
change is related to 
work-specific 
progress 
(work integration) 
Informational 
Social Regards feedback 
on the acceptability 
of non-task 
behaviors; allows 
one to assess 
acceptance in 
workgroup 
Why and how 
change is related to 
non-task behaviors 
(social integration); 
why change will 
lead to acceptance 
Normative 
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Thus, in investigating whether reasons for and against an organizational change fall 
into categories, I draw from the socialization and social psychology literature to suggest that 
there are likely five subcategories of reasons (those listed above in association with 
socialization).  I further suggest that these subcategories can be represented by two meta-
categories: normative and informational. This claim can be tested with a combination of 
qualitative and quantitative research. 
Hypothesis 1A: Employee-elicited reasons for and against a change can be independently 
coded into five categories: technical, referent, normative, performance, and social. 
 
Hypothesis 1B: A second-level of analysis of employee-elicited reasons for and against a 
change will result in two higher-level factors; such factors can be considered as normative 
and informational. 
 
This attempt to put reasons for and against a change initiative into empirical and 
theoretical categories has the potential to significantly increase our understanding of how 
employees consider and relate to change initiatives.  To date, attempts at organizing 
employee responses have been idiosyncratic and atheoretical (Rousseau & Tijoriwala, 1999); 
also they have often focused solely on manager-generated accounts (Bies & Shapiro, 1993).  
This current research provides a theoretical logic for categorizing reasons, while also 
enabling reasons to be used in other research contexts.  The advances possible with this 
categorization would allow researchers to more systematically study reactions to 
organizational change.   
More specifically, the value of categorizing reasons increases significantly if reasons and 
reason categories can be linked to hierarchical positions, communication patterns, and 
ultimately to types of behaviors.  To that end, the next chapter suggests how certain reason 
types may come to be accepted by multiple people in a social system—and it also relates how 
people likely form commitment and behavioral responses as a result of these reasons. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
 
Reasons For and Against Supporting a Change and Dyadic Network Influence During 
Organizational Change 
 
In the previous chapter I suggested that reasons have organizing categories and that 
reasons for or against supporting an organizational change ultimately affect attitudes and 
behavioral intentions regarding that change.  In this chapter, I continue to focus on reasons 
and use them as a vehicle to test how the reactions of influential network members may 
predict the reactions of others in the network.  Again, promoting or accepting reasons for or 
against supporting a change are one kind of reaction to change, and they are potentially a key 
area of comparison and exchange between employees who are experiencing and discussing 
change.  In accordance with the model in Figure 4.0, I suggest that after individuals have 
been exposed to reasons from different sources they consider how to value, weight, and 
potentially adopt different reasons from different network sources.  In order to make claims 
about how an individual might do this, I discuss the role of power and influence in social 
interactions. 
Power and Influence in Social Network Communications 
Most research that focuses on influence in social networks considers power and 
influence from a resource dependency viewpoint, where it is assumed that people who are 
able to control resources increase others dependence on them and thus they acquire power 
(Burkhardt & Brass, 1990; Ibarra et al., 1993; Krackhardt, 1990; Krackhardt & Brass, 1994; 
Rogers, 2003).  In times of uncertainty, such as during an organizational change, resources 
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can include access to information, previous experience with the subject of the change, 
training, or access to other forms of physical or financial support.  Such information can be 
highly salient for organizational survival and for individual success at work.  People who 
have the information, opportunity, and skill set to explain and aid in sensemaking regarding 
the change are likely to be influential, as they help minimize the cognitive dissonance and 
uncertainty that accompany a change request. 
In studies that assess both communication network information and influence data, an 
individual’s influence is assessed by asking respondents to identify others in the network 
whom they communicate with in relation to the change, and by then asking them to rate the 
influence of these people (vis-à-vis the change), as well as the frequency of discussions, on a 
Likert scale (Brass, 1984; Podolny & Baron, 1997; Umphress, Labianca, Brass, Kass, & 
Scholten, 2003).  Such a rating attempts to capture who is most influential to the respondent 
in the context of the change.   
In the context of this dissertation, influence ratings are subjective reactions to (and 
decisions about) others in the network, and such judgments are idiosyncratic to the context of 
the change.  For some people (and some changes), the most influential person will be a 
resource provider or a subject matter expert, while for others, the most influential individual 
might be a persuasive friend or superior.  In this study, the focus is accepting the 
respondent’s rating of whom they find to be the most influential in relation to the particular 
change, and then identifying the reasons (or perceived reasons) of that person.  Here, 
identifying the most influential person in an individual’s ego network (Marsden, 1990) is key 
to understanding which reasons for and against a change will be most discussed and 
accepted.  I argue that over time, influential individuals can exert a disproportionate amount 
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of influence on the reasons (and thus the commitment and implementation behaviors) of 
others in the work environment.  The argument is partially based on research on selected 
scores and upward influence (Taylor, 2004; Taylor, Jones, Hofmann, & Mathieu, 2005).  
Figure 4.0 below indicates, in a very generic manner, how the concept of selected score and 
influence relate. 
 
Figure 4.0: Selected Scores and Social Influence (from Taylor, 2004) 
 
Influence in the Context of this Change:  1-7 scale 
7.0
5.96.0
6.2
4.5
Reasons of this team member  Her reasons affect respondent 
and any others who find her 
most influential 
Team member  
with the most 
influence over 
respondent 
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I suggest that the selected score phenomenon modeled above occurs in situations 
where individuals are selecting reasons for or against supporting a change. I argue that over 
time, the reasons of the most influential individual are “selected,” and that this person exerts 
influence on the formation of reasons above and beyond the reasons of other individuals and 
above and beyond the reasons the respondent originally favored.  Thus, over time, individual 
reasons for supporting a change will likely be affected by the reasons of the most 
communicative, persuasive, or otherwise influential person in the context of this change. His 
or her opinion essentially serves as a weighting mechanism in meetings and in individual and 
group discussions.  Time, as discussed below, plays an important role in this process. 
 
Introducing Time: Early vs. Later Reasons For/Against Supporting a Change 
 When a change is first introduced, the shock to the system is still “fresh.” There is a 
great deal of uncertainty, and in these early stages people are still in flux regarding their 
reactions to the change.  Additionally, they are still learning how those around them are 
responding to the change. Thus, when the change is introduced, people are likely making 
their early evaluations of the change (and of their reasons for supporting or resisting that 
change) based on individual differences, initial impressions, and prior experience.  However, 
as people continue to interact with others who are supporting (or not supporting) the change, 
opinions and behaviors related to supporting the change are likely to alter (Barley, 1990; 
Drazin et al., 1999; Gioia, Thomas, Clark, & Chittipeddi, 1994; Greenberg, 1995; Ridgeway, 
Berger, & Smith, 1985).  With time, the role of opinion leaders will likely play a stronger 
role in how the change is considered and used (Drazin et al., 1999; George & Jones, 2001; 
Gioia et al., 1994; Greenberg, 1995; Langley, 1999; Volkema, Farquhar, & Bergmann, 
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1996).  Thus reasons (and the commitment and behaviors that flow from reasons) change as a 
result of the sensemaking and social information processing that accompany an 
organizational change.   
Regarding how power and influence change over time, in a longitudinal study that 
measured changes in network centrality and power after the introduction of a technology 
change, Burkhardt and Brass (1990) found that while some early adopters increased their 
power after the technology change, the people who were powerful prior to the change 
remained powerful later (the correlation between power in the two time periods was .84).  
Thus it follows that the group member who is most influential in the early stage of 
implementation likely remains influential throughout.  Because the most influential person 
functions as an informal leader (at least in specific dyads), their ultimate reason “vote” 
regarding a change should affect an individual’s reasons for or against supporting the change, 
and likely sways the individual from their original reasons after repeated interactions.   
Given this background, the following hypothesis regards the development of reasons 
for and against supporting a change during the early stages of change implementation.  The 
“early stage” is defined as the period that begins with the announcement of the change and it 
lasts for at least three to six months thereafter (this time period was selected based on 
research precedent (Taylor & Todd, 1995; Venkatesh & Davis, 2000)).   
Hypothesis 2: The Time 2 reasons of the person given the highest influence rating by 
the respondent will significantly predict the Time 2 reasons of the respondent, even 
controlling for Time1 reasons of the respondent.   
 
Potential Moderators of the Influence Relationship 
 
The tendency to “self-monitor” is an individual difference variable which is related to 
how susceptible people are to social influence effects (Burkhardt, 1994; Mehra, Kilduff, & 
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Brass, 2001; Pollock, Whitbred, & Contractor, 2000; Snyder & Gangestad, 1986).  
Specifically, self-monitoring refers to the extent to which an individual attends to social cues 
in order to determine the appropriateness of their own individual attitudes and behaviors 
(Snyder et al., 1986).  The construct describes the extent to which people stay “true to 
themselves” versus the extent to which people alter their behaviors based upon situational 
cues and requirements.   Chameleon-like high self-monitors use social cues to adjust 
behavior, while true-to-themselves low self-monitors tend to behave the same across 
situations.  Network research that attempts to understand the relationship between self-
monitoring and social information processing has found high self-monitors more likely to be 
influenced by the social environment (and by social information processing mechanisms in 
particular) (Burkhardt, 1994; Mehra et al., 2001; Pollock et al. 2000).   
Thus, I expect the effects of self-monitoring will be similar in the situation described 
in hypothesis two above—specifically, I suggest that people who are high self-monitors will 
be more likely to be affected by the reasons of influential people in their network.  I argue 
that the strength of the relationship between Time 1 and Time 2 reasons of the respondent (in 
relation to the Time 2 reasons of the influential person) will be stronger when the respondent 
is a high self-monitor than when the respondent is a low self-monitor.  Stated formally: 
Hypothesis 2B: Self-monitoring will moderate the hypothesized relationship between 
the Time 2 reasons of the person given the highest influence and the T2 reasons of the 
respondent (even controlling for the Time 1 reasons of the respondent), such that the 
relationship will be stronger when the respondent is a high self-monitor. 
 
Relationship Symmetry in Work Relationships 
 
Hypothesis 2 does not address the symmetry of the influence relationship, nor does it 
fully describe change over time.  Given the hierarchical and socially stratified nature of many 
work settings, both symmetrical and asymmetrical influence is likely (e.g. one person 
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considers another influential in the context of the change, but the feeling of influence is not 
reciprocated) (Brass & Burkhardt, 1993).  For example, consider the case where an 
experienced technology user is selected as the most influential person in the context of a 
change related to that technology—that particular user may be selected by an employee but 
that user may not select the employee as most influential in the context of this change.  In 
such cases, I would suggest that the employee reasons for and against supporting a change 
would migrate towards the reasons endorsed by the influential person, but his/her reasons 
would not migrate towards the reasons of the employee.   
Similarly, there are likely some cases (consider two raters who are both in upper 
management and who have similar hierarchical rankings and credentials related to the 
change) where both people might rate the other as equally influential in the context of the 
change.  In such cases, one would expect that their mutual sense of influence caused them to 
exchange information and become even more similar over time in terms of reasons. 
 Both symmetric influence and asymmetric influence scenario as outlined above can 
be tested empirically.  Stated in formal terms: 
Hypothesis 3A: The degree of symmetry in an influence relationship will be positively 
related to the closeness of reasons, such that the reasons of people in symmetrical 
relationships will be the most similar to each other, the reasons of people in asymmetric 
relationships will be less similar, and the reasons of people with no relationship will be 
the least similar.   
 
Previously, I described how the tendency to self-monitor can alter social influence 
effects, and I suggested that people who are high self-monitors are more likely to be affected 
by the reasons of influential people in their network.   Accordingly, I expect that self-
monitoring could moderate the relationship described in hypothesis three above.  I argue that 
the strength of the hypothesized relationship between symmetry and reason similarity 
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between the respondent and the most influential person will be stronger when the respondent 
is a high self-monitor than when the respondent is a low self-monitor.  Stated formally: 
Hypothesis 3B: Self-monitoring will moderate the effects of respondent relationship 
symmetry and the closeness of reason ratings between the respondent and the most 
influential person, such that the strength of the hypothesized relationships between 
symmetry levels and closeness of reason ratings will be stronger when the respondent is 
a high self-monitor.   
 
CHAPTER FIVE 
 
Reason Types and Commitment to Change 
 
In the previous chapters, I introduced reasons for and against supporting a change as 
an important element of social comparison during the sensemaking stage of dealing with an 
organizational change.  I then suggested that reasons move through dyadic networks in 
situations where influential people guide others to accept their reasons for and against the 
change.  However, reasons for and against supporting a change are also important because 
they directly relate to cognitions and behavioral intentions (Westaby, 2005; Westaby et al., 
1997; Westaby et al., 2005).  Thus, it is possible that reasons are related to cognitions about 
commitment to change.   
In this chapter, I build on this logic and suggest that certain reasons lead to certain 
types of commitment to change—and thus people with similar reasons may also have similar 
levels of commitment to the change.  Specifically, I argue that certain types of reasons 
solidify affective, cognitive, or mixed reactions to the change request, and that different types 
of reactions relate to different types of commitment to change (and, ultimately, to different 
behaviors related to the change).  Making these connections requires introducing the 
commitment to change construct and linking network theory to its dimensions. 
Commitment to Change- A Three-Component Model 
Commitment to change is defined as “a force (mind set) that binds an individual to a 
course of action deemed necessary for the successful implementation of a change initiative” 
(Herscovitch & Meyer, 2002: 475).  The construct is derived from the multidimensional 
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organizational commitment construct (Meyer & Allen, 1991), and like organizational 
commitment, the commitment to change construct also has three constituent components.  
Essentially, the commitment force or mindset can take different forms: that of desire 
(affective commitment), perceived cost (continuance commitment) or obligation (normative 
commitment).  These three mindsets essentially refer to the employee feeling as if they want 
to, have to, or ought to support the initiative.  In the case of commitment to change, affective 
commitment to change is a desire to support the change based on desire and a belief in its 
inherent benefits; normative commitment to change stems from a sense of obligation to 
provide support for the change; and continuance commitment comes from a recognition that 
there are costs associated with failure to provide support for the change.   
Research shows that these mindsets are distinguishable from one another (although 
continuance and normative commitment are correlated (between .41-.64 in some studies)), 
and that they relate differentially to change related behaviors (Herscovitch et al., 2002).  In 
particular, one study related the commitment types to behavioral outcomes of: compliance 
(providing minimum support and doing so reluctantly), cooperation (exerting effort, going 
along with the spirit of the change, and making modest sacrifices), and championing 
(enthusiastically going above and beyond formal requirements to ensure success and 
promoting the change to others) (Herscovitch & Meyer, 2002).   The findings of this study 
and a description of the types of commitment are outlined in Table 5.0 below. 
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Table 5.0 
Commitment to Organizational Change- Definitions and Outcomes 
(Based on Hercovitch & Meyer, 2002) 
 
Type of Commitment 
to Change  
Accompanying 
Mindset 
Definition and 
Potential  
Bases of 
Commitment 
Potential Outcomes 
Affective      (I want to) Desire Provide support for 
change based on a 
belief in its inherent 
benefits 
(from personal 
involvement, 
identification with the 
target, or value 
congruence) 
Correlates 
significantly and 
positively with: 
 
 Compliance 
 Cooperation 
 Championing 
Continuance (I have to) Cost Recognition that there 
are costs associated 
with failure to support 
(from sense of 
accumulated 
investments or 
“sidebets” that could 
be lost; or from lack 
of alternatives) 
Correlates 
significantly and 
positively with: 
 
 Compliance 
Normative    (I ought to) Obligation Sense of obligation to 
support change 
(from cultural and/or 
organizational 
socialization or a 
receipt of benefits that 
activate the need to 
reciprocate) 
Correlates 
significantly and 
positively with: 
 
 Compliance 
 Cooperation 
 Championing 
(occasionally) 
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As this table identifies, the study utilizing the three-component model found that all 
three components of commitment to change were related but distinguishable.  The study also 
found that all three types of commitment correlate significantly with self-reported 
compliance; while only normative and affective commitment correlate significantly with 
cooperation and championing behaviors (Herscovitch & Meyer, 2002).   
Interestingly, researchers also found that people who were uncommitted to the change 
still reported a general willingness to comply with changes in their organization.  Researchers 
could not fully explain this result, but they speculated that “employees might be reluctant to 
resist a change unless they view it as having serious negative consequences for 
themselves…there are likely to be other factors that discourage employees from resisting a 
change…” (Herscovitch & Meyer, 2002).  This statement suggests that commitment to 
change may not always mediate compliance, and it also suggests that researchers need to 
“tease out” the specific reasons why people do or do not exhibit a behavior  (such as 
compliance).  I argue that by gaining a better understanding of the reasons people use to 
justify their intentions and behaviors, researchers can move from speculation (above) about 
behavioral outcomes to prediction of such outcomes.  Also, because of the paucity of 
research using the three-component model of commitment to change, this area of research 
can be strengthened with further inquiry and improved measurement.  Mapping the influence 
of reasons in a social network (as suggested in this research) enables such inquiry and 
improvement. 
Reason Types and Affective, Continuance, and Normative Commitment 
The earlier section on reasons theory and reason types suggested that reasons differ in 
the amount and type of information they provide.  Again, in considering the two meta-
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categories of reasons, there are informational and normative categories of reasons.  
Reviewing the definitions of each category reveals that “normative” reasons are highly 
relevant to organizational culture and to socialization; whereas “informational” reasons are 
highly job- and task-relevant.  Due to the fact that this paper utilizes the term “normative” in 
two different contexts (i.e. “normative reasons” and “normative commitment to change”), I 
make an effort to avoid confusion by referring to “normative reasons” as 
“normative/socialization reasons” in this document. 
Normative/socialization reasons concern issues such as acceptance, integration, value 
congruence, and social functioning related to the change—all of which could relate to 
creating a desire to commit to the change based on involvement, value congruence, or 
identification with the change (all components of affective commitment to change).  Given 
the value- and socially-based nature of normative reasons (and their focus on emotions, 
values, and beliefs), and given the definition of affective commitment as desire based on 
identification, value congruence, and emotional involvement, I argue that normative reasons 
are more likely to trigger feelings of affective commitment.  Thus, people who share similar 
normative/socialization reasons, and who likely more frequently discuss these reasons, would 
likely have similar reactions of affective commitment to the change. 
Hypothesis 4A: Normative (i.e. socialization-related) reasons will be positively and 
significantly related to affective commitment to change. 
 
Continuance Commitment to Change 
 In direct contrast to affective commitment to change, feelings of continuance 
commitment to change have a much lower affective component (since continuance 
commitment is about calculating options and considering costs of failure to support). As 
such, continuance commitment is highly cognitive in comparison to the other forms of 
34 
 
commitment to change, and it is focused on ramifications, implications, and potential factual 
outcomes related to the change.  Thus, normative/socialization reasons—with their emphasis 
on emotions, values, and beliefs—are much less likely to influence continuance commitment.  
However, informational reasons emphasize work-related information, technical outcomes 
and exchanges, and instrumental reasoning.  These reasons are highly cognitive and are more 
likely to emphasize and reinforce feelings about costs, benefits, and job-related outcomes 
related to the change.  Thus, people who emphasize instrumental reasons (where cognitive 
considerations are dominant) would likely have similar reactions of continuance commitment 
to the change (because continuance commitment is highly calculative and cognitive). 
Hypothesis 4B: Informational reasons will be positively and significantly related to 
continuance commitment to change. 
 
Normative Commitment to Change 
 Lastly, I suggest that normative commitment to change, which concerns feelings of 
obligation to support the change, has both an affective and a cognitive component.  
Specifically, one can feel obligated because the change is in line with beliefs, because the 
change matters to friends, and/or because one wants to appear consistent (all affect-laden 
reasons that could be categorized as “normative” given the earlier definition of 
normative/socialization reasons); however, one could also feel obligated to support the 
change because the change is important to powerful people or because such support is owed 
as a returned favor (all instrumental, cognitive calculations that could be categorized as 
“informational” reasons according to the earlier definition of informational reasons).  By 
definition, normative commitment to change has less of an affective component than does 
affective commitment to change, but the affective component remains—the sense of 
obligation can come from social exchange feelings with other affective ties; and it can also 
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come from a cognitive weighting of owed support.  Feelings of normative commitment to 
change will likely involve both the gathering of information and the gathering of affective 
support.  Thus, I expect that both normative/socialization and informational reasons will 
influence normative commitment, and this influence will be evident in the similarity of 
normative commitment between employees who share these reasons.  Given this logic, I 
offer the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4C: Both normative/socialization and informational reasons will be 
positively and significantly related to normative commitment to change. 
 
In this chapter I argue that particular reasons tend to reflect and solidify certain 
affective, cognitive, or mixed reactions to a change request; and that such reactions relate to 
different types of commitment to change.  I investigate the link between different types of 
reasons and the interpersonal similarity of employee ratings on their affective, normative, and 
continuance commitment.  I predict that different reasons influence commitment to different 
degrees, depending on the type of commitment being studied.  The next chapter explores how 
this commitment to change might relate to reasons and implementation behaviors.   
 
CHAPTER SIX 
 
Commitment Types and Implementation Behaviors 
 
This chapter suggests that different forms of commitment to change relate to different 
implementation behaviors associated with a change request.  More specifically, I follow the 
research of Herscovitch and Meyer (2002) and argue that all commitment types lead to 
compliance behaviors related to the change, while some types of commitment to change are 
related to discretionary behaviors such as cooperation and championing. 
This section will explain that despite the fact that there are three types of commitment 
to change, it is possible to relate the different types to different behavioral outcomes.  This 
argument builds on the work of Herscovitch and Meyer (2002) whose research on 
commitment to change makes a distinction between focal behaviors and discretionary 
behaviors.  Focal behavior is “that course of action to which an individual is bound by his or 
her commitment,” whereas discretionary behavior is “any course of action that, although not 
specified in the terms of the commitment, can be included within these terms at the discretion 
of the individual (e.g. exerting extra effort)” (Herscovitch & Meyer, 2002: 475).   
The authors continue to suggest that any commitment, regardless of form, should lead 
to the enactment of the focal behavior—in the case of change this enactment would take the 
form of compliance with explicit requirements for change.  However, discretionary behaviors 
would include responses to the change that involve going along with the spirit of the change 
and enacting modest sacrifices for the change (cooperation). A more intense discretionary 
response would include enacting behaviors that require considerable personal sacrifice, or 
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behaviors intended to promote the value of the change to others inside or outside the 
organization (championing).  The extent to which employees would engage in any 
discretionary behavior would depend on the mind-set they have and the type of commitment 
related to that mind-set.  
On the basis of the distinctions in discretionary behaviors listed above, I suggest the 
following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 5A: Affective, normative, and continuance commitment to change will 
correlate positively with the focal behavior (compliance with the requirements for 
change). 
 
Hypothesis 5B: Only affective and normative commitment to change will be positively 
related to discretionary behavior (cooperation and championing).  Continuance 
commitment to change will be unrelated, or negatively related to discretionary 
behaviors. 
 
These proposed relationships between commitment to change and implementation 
behavior can be tested by asking supervisors to rate the implementation behaviors of 
individuals, as well as by asking people to self-report their actions.   
A summary of the relationships among and between all of the hypotheses is found in 
Figure 6.0 below. 
Figure 6.0:
Process Model and Hypothesized Relationships
H1A: Employee-elicited reasons for and against a change can be independently coded into five categories: technical, referent, normative, performance, and social.
H1B: A second-level of analysis of employee-elicited reasons for and against a change will result in two higher-level factors; such factors can be considered as normative and
informational.
H2A: The Time 2 reasons of the person given the highest influence rating by the respondent will significantly predict the Time 2 reasons of the respondent, even controlling for
Time1 reasons of the respondent.
H2B: Self-monitoring will moderate the hypothesized relationship between the Time 2 reasons of the person given the highest influence and the T2 reasons of the respondent
(even controlling for the Time 1 reasons of the respondent), such that the relationship will be stronger when the respondent is a high self-monitor.
H3A: The degree of symmetry will be positively related to the closeness of reasons, such that the reasons of people in symmetrical relationships will be the most similar to each
other, the reasons of people in asymmetric relationships will be less similar, and the reasons of people with no relationship will be the least similar.
H3B: Self-monitoring will moderate the effects of respondent relationship symmetry and the closeness of reason ratings, such that the strength of the hypothesized relationships
between levels of respondent symmetry and closeness of reason ratings will be stronger when the respondent is a high self-monitor.
H4A: Normative reasons will be positively related to affective commitment to change.
H4B: Informational reasons will be positively related to continuance commitment to change.
H4C: Both normative reasons and informational reasons will be positively related to normative commitment to change.
H5A: Affective, normative, and continuance commitment to change will correlate positively with the focal behavior (compliance with the requirements for change).
H5B: Only affective and normative commitment to change will be positively related to discretionary behavior (cooperation and championing). Continuance commitment to
change will be unrelated, or negatively related to discretionary behaviors.
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
Methodology 
 
Research Sample and Procedures 
I tested the hypothesized relationships described above in an applied field setting.  I 
identified a top-down, large-scale change effort taking place in the University of North 
Carolina Hospital system (UNCH), and secured access to employees in order to study their 
responses to the change via an internet-based survey.  Specifically, the change was the 
introduction of a new program for patient care and crisis management.  The program is 
referred to as “Rapid Response Teams (RRT)” and it consists of a protocol whereby a nurse 
(or a doctor) can initiate a Rapid Response call if he/she notices deteriorating  conditions—
and by definition the call results in the immediate arrival of a respiratory therapist, a senior 
nurse, and a doctor.  Part of the RRT program is a stipulation that no call is to be judged or 
questioned, as it should always be “safe” for a nurse to act on his or her instincts.  The 
change is significant in that its use has been proven to reduce mortality in hospitals (as well 
as the acuity of “code calls” in hospitals), and it allows nurses more autonomy in patient care.  
The change is controversial because some doctors and nurses are not comfortable with nurses 
taking action instead of waiting for the patient’s primary physician to notice and/or respond 
to deteriorating conditions.  The change is also controversial because it requires some staff 
members to do “double duty” by wearing the RRT pager as well as being required to care for 
their usual patients and attend to the standard duties of their non-RRT job. 
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One area of the hospital (pediatrics) has officially instituted Rapid Response Teams 
(meaning that all staff have been trained about the program, sensitized to the calls, and 
people alternate the responsibility of wearing the RRT pager and responding to calls).  In 
contrast, other areas are still deciding whether or not to adopt the change.  In addition, at the 
time I launched the survey, several units in the hospital had just finished running a six-month 
RRT pilot program.   For six months certain units acted as “test areas” by adopting RRT for 
the trial period.   Hospital administrators were interested in understanding employee 
reactions to the change because they were considering launching a hospital-wide roll-out of 
the program.  Thus, I was granted access to the units who had launched the pilot program, 
access to the units that had already put the program in place, and access to units where people 
had not had any direct experience with the program.  While the program impacts nurses, 
patients, doctors, residents, and specially-trained nurses known as “respiratory therapists,” its 
impact is greatest on the nurses and respiratory therapists.  Thus, the internet survey was 
launched among the sample of nurses and respiratory therapists described above.   
This change program met the basic requirements implied by my hypotheses.  Namely, 
the change: 1) created enough controversy to stimulate discussion, debate, and a potential 
difference of opinion; 2) compliance with the change had a discretionary component (nurses 
could choose not to implement the program, they could refuse to wear the special pager, or 
they could be champions of the program); and 3) compliance with the program could be 
externally noted and checked (because RRT calls are monitored and studied).   
I was able to gain access to a small sample of physicians, nurses, and nurse managers 
prior to creating the survey in order to elicit employee-generated reasons for and against 
supporting the change.  After creating the survey using the employee-generated items and 
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other items described below, I was given a list of email addresses for 726 nurses and 90 
respiratory therapists.   
All of the names on this list received a customized email (customized by the survey 
software program to go to each individual email address for matching purposes).  The email 
contained a link to the survey and a personalized letter of introduction from the Patient 
Safety Officer at the hospital (a person whom they would recognize and potentially respect as 
an “insider”).  Over a six-week period, people received two additional reminders via email, 
and the third notice introduced an incentive (their names would be in a drawing for gift 
certificates at a local retailer).   
Of the 816 total emails sent, 21 came back due to address errors and 19 responded 
that they were not appropriate respondents (for reasons such as they worked too few hours or 
they no longer worked in the pertinent area of the hospital).  Thus, a total of 776 surveys 
were appropriately sent out to the sample, and 184 usable surveys were returned for a 
response rate of 24%.    
Demographics
The majority of the respondents were nurses (66%), and the remaining respondents 
chose the category named “other.”  No residents (medical students) filled out the survey, as 
the sponsor of the study plans to survey residents and physicians using a separate instrument.  
Thus, these results were as expected. 
The majority of the respondents were female (82%), which is consistent with 
employee statistics on nursing staff demographics available from the hospital.  The 
breakdown of tenure information indicates that the bulk of the respondents have been 
employed as nurses for more than six years (64%). Specifically, 12% have been employed 
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less than one year; 12% have been employed from 1 – 2 years; 12% have been employed 
from 3 – 5 years; 15% have been employed from 6 – 10 years; 9% have been employed from 
11 – 15 years; 13% have been employed from 16 – 20 years; and 27% have been employed 
for more than 21 years.   
While a significant portion of the respondents (71%) had some previous experience 
with rapid response teams, respondents were almost evenly divided among the experience 
categories: 29% had some previous experience with adult rapid response teams, 30% had 
some experience with pediatric rapid response teams, 12% had some previous general 
experience with rapid response teams, and 29% had no previous experience with rapid 
response teams.   
Due to the nature of the sampling method, demographic statistics were not available 
to compare respondents to non-respondents according to gender, work experience, functional 
area, or previous experience with rapid response teams.  In particular, all contacts at the 
hospital were concerned that none of this type of data be released. Hospital administrators 
did supply nurse names and email addresses organized by unit (or floor), as well as 
information on the nurse manager in charge of each unit, but due to privacy concerns they 
did not want to share any detailed demographic information.  Therefore, from the data they 
did provide, it was not possible to deduce gender, experience, functional area, or previous 
exposure to RRT if a nurse (or respiratory therapist) did not respond to the survey. 
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Ego Networks
Because of the importance of studying social interaction and ego networks in this 
research, this project required that I gather data about who talks to whom.  Thus, as part of 
the survey, I asked people to name and rate the influence level of the people they talk to in 
relation to this change.  I followed the procedures previously used by Brass (1984), Marsden 
(1990), Ibarra (1992), Ibarra and Andrews (1993), and Podolny and Baron (1997)—which 
involve asking the respondent to enumerate those individuals with whom  he or she has direct 
ties, and leaving blank spaces in which respondents can write names.  This method has 
proven successful in several contexts, and best practices with the method suggest limiting 
measurement error by giving respondents freedom in selecting the number of people to list 
(Holland & Leinhard, 1973; Marsden, 1990).  Given the email format of the survey, we were 
not able to provide unlimited space, but we did allow up to 8 names.  The majority of 
respondents (86%) limited themselves to five.  This number was used in previous network 
research as well (Burt, 1984).   I was only able to use responses where people provided actual 
names of influential others (n = 184). 
 
Measures 
 
Reasons For and Against Supporting the Change 
 
Using Behavioral Reasons Theory requires that researchers meet with employees to 
gather employee-elicited reasons for and against the change in question.  For this research, I 
met with nine hospital representatives to discuss the change and to gather all of their reasons 
for and against supporting the change.  I used a semi-structured interview technique where I 
recorded their responses to open-ended questions.  My plan was to talk to as many 
representatives as was necessary until respondents consistently offered repetitive information 
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and no new reasons for or against supporting the change surfaced.  This goal was 
accomplished after nine hour-long interviews.  My interviews were with two doctors, one 
patient safety officer, one nurse educator, one nurse manager, and four nurses (two from 
pediatrics and two from adult surgery floors).  The interviews resulted in the creation of 27 
total items (15 in the “reasons for” category and 12 in the “reasons against” category).  A full 
list of the items is found in table 6.0 and table 6.1.   
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Table 6.0 
Reasons For Supporting RRT as Generated From Interviews 
Reason Given (For Supporting RRT) 
1.   RRT should be an integral part of a teaching hospital. 
2.   The RRT program can expedite the patient’s progress to the appropriate destination. 
3.   It allows me to take better care of the patient—I don’t have to wait for someone to get 
back to me once I know there is a problem. 
4.   It allows us to catch problems before they become overwhelming. 
5.   The RRT program can decrease a patient’s length of stay. 
6.   Having the RRT available improves patient outcomes. 
7.   I finally have a way to get the assistance I need for my patient (in a timely manner). 
8.   I can get extra hands and help when I am unsure of a patient’s condition. 
9.   I have more autonomy as a caregiver. 
10. It provides advanced assessment and intervention training for others—such as people 
who make the call or new nurses and new doctors who see the intervention. 
11. It decreases the acuity of the patient’s who “end up” in ICU. 
12. It provides advanced assessment and intervention training for me. 
13. Authority figures whom I respect really support this program. 
14. Feedback I have heard from other parts of the hospital suggest the RRT program is good. 
15. Peers whom I respect are very positive and really support the RRT program. 
Table 6.1 
Reasons Against Supporting RRT as Generated From Interviews 
Reason Given (Against Supporting RRT) 
1.   This does not have enough resources. 
2.   The administration does not provide enough resources for me to participate properly. 
3.   I don’t think the program can succeed until we have more FTE (full time employees). 
4.   I don’t think we can activate this properly. 
5.   We don’t have enough nurses to do this well. 
6.   I fear that the RRT team might point at me and ask me why I made the call. 
7.   I feel that other care providers are judging me for making the call. 
8.   I don’t like the idea of sending the message that I don’t trust the doctor. 
9.   This will not be judgment free- no matter what they claim. 
10. This could lead to less trust on the floor, not more trust. 
11.  I am not sure what happens if I make a mistake about the call. 
12.  It is intimidating to call in all of that experience, all of those people. 
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After the full survey was created (comprised of the employee elicited reasons as 
shown above as well as from established measures described in the previous chapter), I 
submitted the items in aggregate to the patient safety officer (the sponsor of the survey at the 
hospital) as well as to the two doctors, one nurse, and to a Nursing Review Board for 
comment and pre-testing.  As part of the pre-test, I needed their opinion on ordering certain 
questions.  Specifically, in order to ascertain how respondent attitudes and opinions had 
changed over time, it was necessary to ask respondents to recall how they felt about the 
change six months ago when it was first introduced, as well as how they felt about the change 
at the time of the survey.  With the small group of early respondents, I pre-tested two 
versions of the survey: one where the “how do you feel now” and the “how did you feel 
originally” questions were repeated but were separated by the bulk of the survey questions; 
and one where the questions were asked at the same point in time with two different response 
stems (the response stems were: how did you feel about that reason originally, how do you 
feel now- or vice versa).   
Results from the pretests revealed that people thought their survey was “broken” 
when the questions were separated and then repeated, and they overwhelmingly quit the 
survey at that point (despite the fact that prose in the sample survey explained that the 
questions were intentionally repeated).  Thus, I chose to administer the version where the 
reasons were stated and then were immediately followed by response stems (ultimately, the 
stems prompted them to answer with: “how you felt originally,” and then with: “how you feel 
now”).  In order to prime respondents properly for this type of question, I included prose 
asking them to recall where they lived six months ago, whom they reported to, and in which 
area of the hospital they worked.  The exact wording of the survey is found in the Appendix.  
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After making other minor changes (elaborating acronyms and separating double-
barreled items) as requested by these early respondents, I considered the items as ready for 
use in the survey.  In developing the survey, I created counterbalanced versions to avoid 
problems with order response bias.  Counterbalancing the question order helps eliminates the 
potential of having the results confounded by respondent order heuristics; as well as it 
mitigates potential problems related to respondent fatigue affecting the same questions.  
Thus, in the final version of the survey, I counterbalanced the order in which the “for” and 
the “against” reasons appeared.  Respondents were asked to rank their reactions to the 
reasons on five-point Likert scales where 1 = strongly disagree and five = strongly agree.  
Communication and Influence Networks at UNCH 
 To measure dyadic influence networks, I asked respondents to name actual names of 
those other employees whom they considered influential.  Specifically, I stated: “research 
shows that the informal communication patterns at work can be more important than 
communication through the formal channels.  This section helps me understand who talks to 
whom about what.  After I create a generic communication map, I destroy names and only 
report patterns and trends.  Feel free to contact me if you have any questions about this 
process.” 
I then stated: “considering the people you interact with at work and on your floor, 
please note the people who you talk to about work-related issues and changes such as RRT.  
You can list as many people as you think are appropriate, but please consider at least your 
top five.  Next, please rate them on how influential they are to you – meaning how much 
their opinion has the ability to affect your opinion (1 = an insignificant amount of influence 
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and 5 = a great amount of influence).  Lastly, (in case some ratings are tied) please note the 
person who you think has the greatest ability to affect your opinion about RRT. 
 Interestingly, in about one-quarter of the cases people chose not to mention names.  
Instead, they chose to include categorical information on the types of people they found 
influential (i.e. doctors, nurse managers, peers, respiratory therapists, or such things as 
“personal experience.”).  Because these survey responses did not include actual given names, 
I did not consider them as usable in my analyses of influence effects.  They were removed 
prior to counting the total number of usable surveys (n=184).   
Commitment to Change 
I measured commitment to change using 18 items from Herscovitch and Meyer 
(2002). Specifically, I measured affective commitment to change with six items and I asked 
employees to respond using a five point Likert scale (1= strongly disagree and 5 = strongly 
agree).  The original items included “I believe in the value of this change,” “This change is a 
good strategy for this organization,” “I think that management is making a mistake by 
introducing this change (reverse scored),” “This change serves an important purpose,” 
“Things would be better without this change (reverse scored),” and “This change is not 
necessary (reverse scored).” I altered each of the items so that they specifically referenced 
the RRT program rather than the less specific phrase “the change.”  For example, I changed 
the first item to read “I believe in the value of this RRT program.”  I made similar changes 
for all of the items for all three types of commitment to change.  Coefficient alpha for this 
affective commitment to change measure was .92. 
 The original six items to measure continuance commitment to change (also using the 
five-point Likert scale) included: “I have no choice but to go along with this change,” “I feel 
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pressure to go along with this change,” “I have too much at stake to resist this change,” “It 
would be too costly for me to resist this change,” “Resisting this change is not a viable option 
for me,” and “It would be risky to speak out against this change.”  I altered all of the items so 
that they referenced the “RRT program” rather than “this change.”  Coefficient alpha for this 
measure was .84. 
 The six items to measure normative commitment to change were “I feel a sense of 
duty to work toward this change,” “I do not think it would be right for me to oppose this 
change,” “I would not feel badly about opposing this change (reverse-scored),” “It would be 
irresponsible for me to resist this change,” “I would feel guilty about opposing this change,” 
“I do not feel any obligation to support this change (reverse-scored).”  Again, I altered all of 
the items so that they referenced the “RRT program” rather than “this change.”  Coefficient 
alpha for this measure was .72.   
Behavioral Responses to Change 
I measured compliance, cooperation, and championing behaviors using scales 
originally developed by Herscovitch and Meyer (2002).  Measuring compliance behaviors 
involved three items, all rated on a five-point scale (1=strongly disagree; 5=strongly agree).  
The items were: “I comply with my organization’s directives regarding the change,” “I 
accept role changes,” and “I adjust the way I do my job as required by this change.”  I 
replaced the words “this change” with the specific name of the change, so that the items read 
“I comply with my organization’s directives regarding RRT” and “I adjust the way I do my 
job as required by the RRT program.”  Coefficient alpha for this measure was .81. 
 I measured cooperation using the eight items suggested by previous researchers.  
These items were also rated using a five-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = 
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strongly agree).  The items included: “I work toward the change consistently,” “I remain 
optimistic about the change, even in the face of adversity,” “I avoid former practices, even if 
they seem easier,” “I engage in change-related behaviors that seem difficult in the short-term 
but are likely to have long-term benefits,” “I seek help concerning the change when needed,” 
“I don’t complain about the change,” “I try to keep myself informed about the change,” and  
“I am tolerant of temporary disruptions and/or ambiguities in my job.”  Again, I altered the 
items to make them more specific, and my alterations included replacing any mention of 
“change” with specific mention of the RRT initiative. The coefficient alpha for this measure 
was .85. 
 I measured championing using six items suggested by Herscovitch and Meyer (2002).  
Again, I replaced all mention of “the change” with the specific name of the RRT initiative  
where appropriate.  The exact items were: “I encourage the participation of others in the RRT 
initiative,” “I speak positively about the RRT initiative to co-workers,” “I speak positively 
about RRT to outsiders,” “I try to find ways to overcome RRT change-related difficulties,” “I 
persevere with the RRT initiative in order to reach goals,” and “I try to overcome co-
workers’ resistance toward the RRT initiative.”  Overall, the coefficient alpha for this 
measure was .92.   
Self-Monitoring 
 I measured self-monitoring using the eighteen items from Snyder and Gangestad 
(1986).  Respondents were asked to rate the items as being true or false.  The items included: 
“I can make impromptu speeches even on topics about which I have almost no information 
(T),” “I find it hard to imitate the behavior of other people (F),” “At parties and social 
gatherings, I do not attempt to say or do things that others will like (F),” “I can only argue for 
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ideas which I already believe (F),” “I guess I put on a show to impress or entertain others 
(T),” “I would probably make a good actor (T),” “In a group of people I am rarely the center 
of attention (F),” “In different situations and with different people, I often act like very 
different persons (T),” “I am not particularly good at making other people like me (F),” “I am 
not always the person I appear to be (T),” “I would not change my opinions (or the way I do 
things) in order to please someone or win their favor (F),” “I have considered being an actor 
or an entertainer (T),” “I have never been good at games like charades or improvisational 
acting (F),” “I have trouble changing my behavior to suit different people and different 
situations (F),” “At a party, I let others keep the stories and jokes going (F),” “I feel a bit 
awkward in public and do not show up quite as well as I should (F),” “I can look anyone in 
the eye and tell a lie with a straight face (if for a right end) (T),” “I may deceive people by 
being friendly when I really dislike them (T).”   
 Items listed with a (T) or an (F) indicate how high-self monitors would answer the 
question.  To score the responses, I reverse-coded the true and false items and then summed 
the items to give people a scale score from 1 to 18 (1 = low self monitor; 18 = high self 
monitor).  The coefficient alpha for this measure was .65, below the cut-off of .70 (Nunnally, 
1978) but consistent with previous research utilizing the measure (Snyder & Gangestad, 
1986). 
Demographic Variables 
 I measured several variables of interest related to employee demographics.  
Specifically, I asked them to report their gender and their tenure in their profession (versus 
their tenure at the hospital—this was at the suggestion of the main hospital contact).  
Specifically, their tenure options were: less than one year, one to two years, three to five 
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years, six to ten years, eleven to fifteen years, sixteen to twenty years, and twenty-one years 
or more.  These categories were provided by contacts at the hospital who had used them in 
previous studies and who wanted the questions duplicated for comparison purposes.   
I also requested job titles, departments, and previous experience with types of Rapid 
Response programs (the choices were: experience with adult RRT, experience with pediatric 
RRT, general experience with RRT, no experience, and “other”).  These data were collected 
primarily at the request of the sponsor of the study, who wanted to use the data for purposes 
unrelated to this inquiry.  
CHAPTER EIGHT 
 
Results 
 
Coding Reasons into Categories
The first hypothesis suggested that employee-elicited reasons for and against 
supporting the change could be independently coded into five specific categories 
(performance, role-referent, technical, social, normative).   However, performing a 
preliminary exploratory factor analysis on the data set using principal axis factoring with 
oblique rotation and Kaiser normalization revealed that a five-factor model does not 
appropriately represent the “reasons for” data set or the “reasons against” data set.  Rather, 
the factor analysis indicated that a two-factor model fit the “reasons for” data and a two-
factor model fit the “reasons against” data.   
 Additionally, the results from asking six content experts (five assistant professors in 
Organizational Behavior from three different universities and one PhD student in Strategy) to 
categorize the reason items into five categories corroborated the finding that five categories 
were problematic.  Most experts suggested that two (or potentially three) categories would be 
more appropriate.  Specifically, these experts reached agreement on the categorization of the 
fifteen “reasons for” items into five categories for only 50.2% of the cases (on average).  
Regarding the twelve “reasons against” items, these experts only reached agreement on an 
average of 58.8% of the cases.   
54 
 
Thus, on the basis of the results of exploratory factor analysis and based upon the 
nature of the expert opinions, Hypothesis 1A was not supported.  The lack of support for 
Hypothesis 1A negated the ability to investigate Hypothesis 1B (i.e. H1B suggests that there 
would be two meta-categories encompassing the five subcategories; and that the two meta-
categories would have informational and normative aspects, respectively).  Thus, by default, 
Hypothesis 1B was also not supported.   
 Because testing Hypotheses 2 through 5 requires performing data analyses using 
categories of reason types (which were formerly expected to stem from H1A or H1B), it was 
necessary to identify reason categories using the results from the factor analysis.  Thus, I 
performed follow-up analyses investigating each of the two-factor solutions.  A confirmatory 
factor analysis using LISREL 8.5 (Joreskog & Forbom, 2003) indicated that from the 15 
items that comprise the “reasons for” category there were two main types of reasons; and 
from the 12 items that comprise the “reasons against” category there were also two 
(different) types of reasons (fit statistics follow Table 8.1 below).   
These findings regarding the existence of four main reason types (two in the “reasons 
for” and two in the “reasons against” categories) were corroborated by subject matter experts 
who were again asked to organize the survey items after being given four types of reasons 
from which to select.  For this second round of assessments, a reduced set of three subject 
matter experts (one PhD student and two assistant professors) reached agreement on 97% of 
the cases (the number of experts was reduced for this second round of analysis due to 
availability issues for three of the assistant professors).   
Based on the item content of each factor, I named the factors (or reason types) 
according to common themes.  The types in the “reasons against” category can be classified 
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as 1) reasons related to personal ramifications and possible consequences of initiating an 
RRT call (named “consequences”) and 2) reasons related to concerns about finances and 
other types of resources (named “resources”).  The two types in the “reasons for” category 
can be classified as 1) reasons related to personal goals for career advancement or for patient 
care (named “goals”) and 2) reasons related to social issues such as the opinions of people 
external to the immediate work environment (named “others”).   It was not surprising, given 
the difference in content between the items that comprise the “for” and the “against” reason 
categories, that the two resulting reason types in each category were different.   
Importantly, despite the differences in item content comprising the four types, an 
expert investigation of the content of the types (using three experts again and asking them to 
use the original definitions of “normative” and “informational” categories (Shah, 1998), as 
well as to use the four reason types) indicated that these experts reached agreement (for 95% 
of the reason types) about how the reason types map to the definition of one or the other 
category.   The resulting categorizations are found in Table 8.0 and Table 8.1. 
Specific fit indices for all LISREL analyses are described immediately following the 
item descriptions, factor loadings, factor names (and their categorizations as normative or 
informational) as listed in Table 8.0 and Table 8.1.   
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Table 8.0 
Reasons For Supporting Rapid Response Teams at UNCH- Item Descriptions, Factor 
Loadings, Reason Types and Category Label 
 
Item Description Factor 
Loading
Name of 
Reason Type 
Category 
Label 
Normative vs. 
Informational 
1.  RRT should be an integral part of a teaching 
hospital. 
.843 Goals Informational 
2.  The RRT program can expedite the 
patient’s progress to the appropriate 
destination. 
.827 Goals Informational 
3.  It allows me to take better care of the 
patient—I don’t have to wait for someone to 
get back to me once I know there is a 
problem. 
.785 Goals Informational 
4.  It allows us to catch problems before they 
become overwhelming. 
.714 Goals Informational 
5.  The RRT program can decrease a patient’s 
length of stay. 
.700 Goals Informational 
6.  Having the RRT available improves patient 
outcomes. 
.685 Goals Informational 
7.  I finally have a way to get the assistance I 
need for my patient (in a timely manner). 
.684 Goals Informational 
8. I can get extra hands and help when I am 
unsure of a patient’s condition. 
.672 Goals Informational 
9.  I have more autonomy as a caregiver. .656 Goals Informational 
10. It provides advanced assessment and 
intervention training for others—such as 
people who make the call or new nurses and 
new doctors who see the intervention. 
.653 Goals Informational 
11. It decreases the acuity of the patient’s who 
“end up” in ICU. 
.626 Goals Informational 
12. It provides advanced assessment and 
intervention training for me. 
.592 Goals Informational 
1.   Authority figures whom I respect really 
support this program. 
.816 Others Normative 
2.   Feedback I have heard from other parts of 
the hospital suggest the RRT program is 
good. 
.793 Others Normative 
3.   Peers whom I respect are very positive and 
really support the RRT program. 
.698 Others Normative 
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Table 8.1 
Reasons Against Supporting Rapid Response Teams at UNCH- Item Descriptions, 
Factor Loadings, Reason Types and Category Label 
 
Item Description Factor 
Loading
Name of 
Factor/ 
Reason Type 
Category 
Label: 
Normative vs. 
Informational 
1.   This does not have enough resources. .911 Resources Informational 
2.   The administration does not provide 
enough resources for me to participate 
properly. 
.879 Resources Informational 
3.   I don’t think the program can succeed until 
we have more FTE (full time employees). 
.831 Resources Informational 
4.   I don’t think we can activate this properly. .703 Resources Informational 
5.   We don’t have enough nurses to do this 
well. 
.598 Resources Informational 
1.   I fear that the RRT team might point at me 
and ask me why I made the call. 
.826 Consequences Informational 
2.   I feel that other care providers are judging 
me for making the call. 
.697 Consequences Informational 
3.   I don’t like the idea of sending the message 
that I don’t trust the doctor. 
.694 Consequences Informational 
4.   This will not be judgment free- no matter 
what they claim. 
.674 Consequences Informational 
5.   This could lead to less trust on the floor, 
not more trust. 
.672 Consequences Informational 
6.   I am not sure what happens if I make a 
mistake about the call. 
.670 Consequences Informational 
7.   It is intimidating to call in all of that 
experience, all of those people. 
.650 Consequences Informational 
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As mentioned earlier, I validated the findings suggested above by performing 
appropriate confirmatory factor analyses using LISREL version 8.5 (Joreskog & Sorbom, 
2001).   
Reasons “Against” Category 
Results indicated that the two-factor model for “reasons against” achieved a near-
acceptable fit (S2 = 175.14, p< .001, df =53).  The root mean squared error of approximation 
(Steiger, 1990) was .11, somewhat short of the criteria (.08- .10) for reasonable errors of 
approximation (Browne & Cudeck, 1993).  However, inspection of the modification indices 
indicated a significant correlation between the error terms of two items, and inspection of the 
two items revealed that they shared a common term related to judgment.  (Specifically, the 
items were: “I feel that other care providers are judging me for making the call” and “I feel 
the program will not be judgment-free no matter what they say”).  Thus, I respecified the 
model allowing the error terms for these two items to correlate.  The new model showed 
improved fit (S2 = 119.96, p<.001; df = 52; change statistics: US2 = 55.18, df = 1, p< .001).  
The root mean squared error of approximation (RMSEA; Steiger, 1990) for the new model 
was .085, just meeting the criteria for reasonable errors of approximation (Browne & 
Cudeck, 1992).  With no exceptions, item loadings were greater than .600 (in fact, all were 
greater than .700), suggesting that the items represented their intended constructs (Bagozzi & 
Yi, 1989).  The comparative fit index for the two-factor reasons “against” model (Bentler, 
1990) was .97.  This figure exceeds the .95 criterion suggested by Hu and Bentler (1998), 
again suggesting the adjusted two-factor model more appropriately fits the data.   
 Although the two factors within the “reasons against” category were not highly 
correlated (r = .39), I still proceeded to test a one-factor model in order to verify the value of 
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the two-factor model.  I found the one-factor model to have significantly worse fit than the 
two factor model (S2 = 909.90, p < .001, df = 54, RMSEA = .29; change statistics: US2 =
734.76, df = 1, p< .001), lending further support to the usefulness of the two-factor model. 
Reasons “For” Category 
 Regarding tests of the two suggested factors in the “reasons for” category, results also 
indicated that a two-factor model achieved an acceptable fit to the data (S2 = 231.70, p< .001,
df = 89).  The root mean squared error of approximation for the two-factor model in the 
“reasons for” category (RMSEA; Steiger, 1990) was .09, meeting the criteria (.08 - .10) for 
reasonable errors of approximation (Browne & Cudeck, 1993).  With no exceptions, item 
loadings were greater than .90 suggesting that the items represented their intended constructs 
(Bagozzi & Yi, 1988).  The comparative fit index for the two-factor reasons “against” model 
(CFI; Bentler, 1990) was .97.  This figure exceeds the .95 criterion suggested by Hu and 
Bentler (1999), again suggesting the two-factor model appropriately fits the data.   
 In the “reasons for” category, the two factors were highly correlated (r = .71) 
suggesting the importance of testing for the value and potential parsimony of a one-factor 
model.  Therefore, I tested a one-factor solution, and found it to have significantly worse fit 
to the data than the two factor model (one-factor model: S2 = 358.7, p < .001, df = 90,
RMSEA = .128; change statistics: US2 = 127, df = 1, p< .001).  These results gave further 
support to the appropriateness of the two-factor model. 
Counterbalanced Surveys and Checking for Order Effects 
Earlier I stated that I created two versions of the survey so that the time order of the 
question stems on the reason ratings could be counterbalanced (e.g. some surveys listed a 
reason and then first prompted respondent with the question “please rate with how you feel 
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now” followed by “please rate [the same reason] with how you felt originally.” The other 
version of the survey switched this order).   In order to test for order effects, I coded the 
counterbalanced surveys by version and then performed follow-up t-tests comparing survey 
version and reason ratings for each of the four reason scales.  Results indicated that there was 
no significant order effect for any of the reason types (Resource-related reasons F(1,182) = 
.162, ns; Consequence-related reasons F(1,182) = .002, ns; Others-related reasons F(1, 182) 
= .151, ns; Goals-related reasons F(1,182) = .074, ns). Thus, I collapsed results across both 
survey types and used the combined measures in subsequent hypothesis testing. 
 With this check for order effects completed—and with the CFA results, the 
definitions of the four reason types (Consequences, Resources, Goals, Others), and the expert 
evaluations mapping these to the reason meta-categories (Normative and Informational)—it 
was possible to test the remaining hypotheses offered in this dissertation.   
 Descriptive statistics for all variables used in the analysis, including means, standard 
deviations, and correlations, are shown in Table 8.2.  Internal consistency reliability 
estimates are included along the diagonal.  As Table 8.2 indicates, reliability estimates for all 
scales except self-monitoring exceed the minimum standard of .70 (Nunnally, 1978).  
Table 8.2
Descriptive Statistics
Mean Sd 1 2 3 4 5 6
1. Affective Commitment 4.42 .65 .92
2. Continuance Commitment 2.16 .73 -.60*** .84
3. Normative Commitment 3.32 .71 .24*** .16* .72
4. Compliance 4.03 .61 .34*** -.22*** .07 .81
5. Cooperation 3.86 .53 .46*** -.40*** .11 .69*** .85
6. Championing 3.90 .59 .57*** -.48*** .18* .55*** .77*** .92
7. Self-Monitoring 6.96 3.02 -.06 .01 .04 .03 -.05 -.08
8. Consequences T1 2.63 .73 -.19** .29*** .07 -.22*** -.37*** -.38***
9. Resources T1 2.60 .83 -.25*** .26*** .07 -.23*** -.31*** -.29***
10. Goals T1 3.96 .57 .25*** -.25*** .08 .29*** .34*** .28***
11. Others T1 3.82 .68 .28*** -.27*** .06 .28*** .31*** .27***
12. Consequences T2 2.43 .75 -.35*** .32*** -.05 -.27*** -.43*** -.47***
13. Resources T2 2.49 .93 -.34*** .35*** .07 -.27*** -.35*** -.34***
14. Goals T2 4.24 .58 .51*** -.32*** .25*** .35*** .44*** .44***
15. Others T2 4.13 .73 .46*** -.35*** .20** .38*** .43*** .48***
16. Consequences Person2 T2 2.44 .77 -.06 .03 -.06 .13- -.01 .05
17. Resources Person2 T2 2.47 .92 -.09 .12 -.04 .07 -.06 -.06
18. Goals Person2 T2 4.26 .60 -.01 .01 -.07 -.17* -.11 -.18**
19. Others Person2 T2 4.13 .74 .02 -.09 -.03 -.09 -.01 -.06
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Table 8.2
Descriptive Statistics
Mean Sd 1 2 3 4 5 6
20. Most Influential_Conseq. 1.87 .56 -.04 .13 -.08 .00 -.02 .01
21. Most Influential_Resources 2.59 1.11 -.05 -.09 -.13 .09 .04 .03
22. Most Influential_Goals 4.33 .71 .01 -.04 .04 .01 .19 .05
23. Most Influential_Others 4.33 .67 -.03 .04 -.01 .11 -.04 -.08
24. Similarity_Consequences .86 .62 -.04 -.01 -.05 .14- .01 .07
25. Similarity_Resources 1.04 .61 -.09 .12 -.05 .04 -.07 -.07
26. Similarity_Goals .62 .54 .01 -.01 .10 .18* .12 .19**
27. Similarity_Others .80 .65 -.01 .08 .05 .10 .03 .08
*** p<.001
** p<.01
- p <.10
* p<.05
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Table 8.2
Descriptive Statistics
7 8 9 10 11 12 13
7. Self-Monitoring .65
8. Consequences T1 .02 -
9. Resources T1 -.08 .56*** -
10. Goals T1 -.01 -.33*** -.27*** -
11. Others T1 .00 -.36*** -.41*** .65*** -
12. Consequences T2 .06 .75*** .44*** -.21*** -.24 -
13. Resources T2 -.10 .37*** .84*** -.20** -.33 .37 -
14. Goals T2 -.07 -.14- -.15* .72*** .44 -.30 -.23
15. Others T2 -.07 -.19** -.28*** .39*** .59 -.30 -.36
16. Consequences Person2 T2 -.01 .10 .06 -.06 -.02 .07 .02
17. Resources Person2 T2 -.01 .04 -.02 -.04 .01 .01 -.01
18. Goals Person2 T2 -.04 -.07 -.02 -.03 -.08 -.01 .08
19. Others Person2 T2 -.01 -.06 .01 .04 -.01 .03 .06
*** p<.001
** p<.01
- p<.10
* p<.05
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Table 8.2
Descriptive Statistics
7 8 9 10 11 12 13
20. Most Influential_Conseq. .02 .05 -.02 -.25 -.29* -.01 .01
21. Most Influential_Resources -.02 .04 -.07 -.09 -.24 .14 -.10
22. Most Influential_Goals .15 -.07 -.18 .11 .18 -.01 -.27-
23. Most Influential_Others .03 .04 .10 .02 .02 -.08 .03
24. Similarity_Consequences -.01 .07 .04 -.05 -.02 .04 .00
25. Similarity_Resources -.01 .04 -.02 -.06 .01 .02 -.01
26. Similarity_Goals .03 .07 .01 .05 .09 .02 -.09
27. Similarity_Others .01 .05 -.02 -.03 .02 -.04 -.06
*** p<.001
** p<.01
- p<.10
* p<.05
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Table 8.2
Descriptive Statistics
14 15 16 17 18 19 20
14. Goals T2 -
15. Others T2 .61*** -
16. Consequences Person2 T2 .00 .04 -
17. Resources Person2 T2 -.06 -.08 0.35*** -
18. Goals Person2 T2 -.06 -.21 -0.31*** -0.21*** -
19. Others Person2 T2 -.02 -.07 -0.34*** -0.36*** 0.65*** -
20. Most Influential_Conseq. -.13 -.20 0.14 0.05 -0.15 -0.14 -
21. Most Influential_Resources -.08 -.07 0.20 0.15 -0.11 0.08 0.24-
22. Most Influential_Goals -.05 -.04 -0.13 -0.29* 0.04 0.18 -0.37**
23. Most Influential_Others -.03 -.13 -0.24- -0.31* 0.16 0.13 -0.44***
24. Similarity_Consequences .01 .05 0.03*** -0.06*** 0.05*** 0.03*** 0.17
25. Similarity_Resources -.07 -.08 -0.09*** 0.21*** 0.07*** 0.01- 0.03
26. Similarity_Goals .07 .21 0.00 0.04*** -0.34*** -0.18*** 0.15
27. Similarity_Others .03 .08 -0.01 0.10*** -0.15*** -0.25*** 0.14
*** p<.001
** p<.01
- p <.10
* p<.05
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Table 8.2
Descriptive Statistics
21 22 23 24 25 26 27
21. Most Influential_Resources -
22. Most Influential_Goals -0.14 -
23. Most Influential_Others -0.30* 0.70*** -
24. Similarity_Consequences 0.26- -0.14 -0.24- -
25. Similarity_Resources 0.13 -0.30* -0.30* .17*** -
26. Similarity_Goals 0.09 -0.03 -0.15 .11*** .09*** -
27. Similarity_Others -0.08 -0.18 -0.13 .11*** .14*** .37*** -
*** p<.001
** p<.01
- p <.10
* p<.05
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Inspection of Table 8.2 reveals several significant correlations that may have bearing 
on further analyses.  First, there are significant relationships between all three types of 
commitment to change, which could affect tests of H4 and H5.  For instance, affective 
commitment is significantly (but not highly) correlated to normative commitment (r = .240, p
= .001) and significantly but negatively correlated to continuance commitment (r = -.60, p <
.001).  The relationships between the commitment to change variables in this research are in 
a similar direction as those in other research contexts.  However, in prior research, affective 
and normative commitment to change were more highly correlated ( r = .48 – .57), and 
affective and continuance commitment to change were less highly correlated ( r = .27 - .30) 
(Herscovitch & Meyer, 2002).  The differences in these results suggest that the relationships 
between these three dimensions of commitment to change fluctuate somewhat according to 
the change—and thus the definitions of the dimensions may need refinement if this 
fluctuation repeats across multiple samples.   
Other correlations in the table, such as the relationship between compliance and 
cooperation (r = .69 p < .001), are high but somewhat expected (given the nature of the 
change and definition of the constructs—i.e. people either wear the pager or they don’t, and 
wearing it could be both compliance and cooperation).  Similarly, the relationship between 
compliance and championing (r = .55, p< .001) and between championing and cooperation (r 
= .77, p< .001) indicate that for this sample (and this change) there is a high degree of 
similarity among each of these elective supportive behaviors.  Given the discretionary nature 
of the change, and the fact that supporting the change usually means wearing the pager or 
supporting someone who is wearing the pager, it may be plausible that compliance, 
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cooperation, and championing “look and feel” very similar to the nurses who participate—
and this similarity is reflected in the high correlation. 
 Moving away from bivariate correlations to investigating more complete tests of the 
hypothesized relationships requires testing regression models, and regression results are 
described below.  The first issue under consideration (Hypothesis 2) investigates how reason 
ratings may change over time in relation to the reason ratings of influential others.   
Effects (Over Time) of the Most Influential People 
 
Hypothesis 2 suggested that the Time 2 reasons of the person given the highest influence 
rating by the respondent will significantly (and positively) predict the Time 2 reasons of the 
respondent, even controlling for Time1 reasons of the respondent.  I tested this hypothesis using 
the reason scales (reason types) that came from the factor analyses described previously.  In my 
data set, for both Time 1 and Time 2, respondents have four scale scores based upon the items 
that comprise each of the four reason types (Consequences, Resources, Others, Goals).  In order 
to test this hypothesis, I needed to have Time1 and Time2 data on both the influencer and the one 
who receives the influence.  Thus, I had to re-sort the data set in search of cases where the person 
named as most influential was also a person who filled out a survey.  This need for both 
members of a dyad to have completed a survey took the sample size from 184 to 51.  Using these 
51 dyads, I performed OLS regressions for each of the four reason types.  I predicted respondent 
Time 2 scores would be significantly related to the Time 2 scores of the most influential people 
as well as to the Time 1 score of the respondents.  The results of the regression equations are 
found in table 8.3 below.  The regression results indicated that for two types of reasons 
(Resources and Others) there was a significant relationship between the Time 2 reason ratings of 
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the influential people and the Time 2 reason ratings of those who rated them as influential, even 
controlling for the Time 1 reasons of the respondent. 
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Table 8.3 
 
Employee Time 1 Reasons, Most Influential Person Time 2 Reasons 
and Employee Time 2 Reasons 
 
Model 1:  Direct Effects Consequences
B
Goals
B
Resources
B
Others
B
Constant  .32 2.10***    -.22 1.04 
Employee Time1  .71***    .49***     .92***   .49** 
Most Influential Time 2   .09 .06 .10* .30*
Overall F 32.07*** 14.51*** 87.51*** 6.19** 
R2 0.58***    .39***    .79***   .21** 
*** p<.001 one-tailed 
**   p<.01 one-tailed 
* p<.05 one-tailed 
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 The results from these regression equations show that H2 was partially supported.  
For two of the four types of reason categories, it appears that the Time2 ratings of the most 
influential people did exhibit a positive and significant influence on the Time2 ratings of the 
respondents, even controlling for the Time 1 feelings of the respondents.   
The types of reasons that were most susceptible to this social influence were reasons 
related to resource issues (Resources) and reasons related to the opinions of others (Others).  
The types of reasons that were not significantly affected by social influence effects from the 
most influential others were those related to personal goals (Goals) and consequences of 
implementing the new program (Consequences).  These findings indicate that influential 
people may spend more time talking about reasons related to these resource or social issues, 
or that influential people may be considered as more credible sources for these types of data.  
Further qualitative investigation may be required in order to better understand frequency or 
credibility issues, but without such investigation the results indicated partial support for the 
idea that the impact of influential others is related to changes in respondent ratings over time. 
Self-Monitoring as a Moderator
Hypothesis 2B predicted that the relationship between the Time2 influential person 
reason ratings and the Time 2 respondent reason ratings would be stronger for respondents 
who were high self-monitors.  This hypothesis was created in response to previous research 
which suggests that not all people are equally susceptible to influence; and which further 
suggests the efficacy of self-monitoring as a moderator (Mehra et al., 2001; Snyder et al., 
1986).   Therefore, I tested the construct of “self-monitoring” as a moderator of influence 
effects on reason ratings for each reason category.   
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 As I tested for moderation, I entered the variables in three steps.  In the first step I 
entered the control variable (respondent Time 1 ratings), in the second step I entered the 
Time 2 ratings of the most influential person, and in the third step I entered the interaction 
term.  I repeated this for all four reason types.  However, in all cases there was no significant 
effect for the interaction term (others: t (47) = -1.56, p = n.s.; resources t (47) = .17, p = n.s.; 
goals: t (47) = -1.53, p = n.s.; consequences: t (47) = .68, p = n.s.). Thus, analyses revealed 
no support for the idea that in this sample, self-monitoring moderates the effects of influence. 
 Relationship Symmetry and Employee Reason Types at Time 2 
 In order to test the hypothesis (H3A) that the degree of symmetry in an influence 
relationship will be positively related to the closeness of reasons (such that the reasons of 
people in symmetrical relationships will be the most similar to each other, the reasons of 
people in asymmetric relationships will be less similar, and the reasons of people with no 
relationship will be the least similar), it was necessary to match respondents based upon 
symmetry data.  For every person in the data set, there were three possible ratings that could 
characterize the symmetry of their relationship with others in the data set (i.e. there could be 
a two-way relationship, a one-way relationship, or no relationship—corresponding to full 
symmetry, asymmetry, or no symmetry).  Thus, if there was a person in the data set who had 
a total of two relationships with others in the set (assume one one-way relationship and one 
two-way relationship), this person would be in the position of having one symmetrical 
relationship, one asymmetrical relationship, and 182 non-relationships with the remaining 
people in the data set.  The symmetry entries for this person would then include a one (for the 
one-way relationship), a two (for the two-way relationship), and then 182 zeroes (for the 
remaining nonexistent relationships).  Organizing the data set of 184 people in this manner 
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(and removing any opportunities for double-counting a relationship) resulted in over 16,000 
possible comparisons.   
 After organizing the data for all of the respondents according to the three types of 
symmetry options, it was evident that there were only eight cases where fully symmetrical 
relationships were noted (i.e. where both parties filled out a survey and both named the other 
as influential).  In contrast, there were 203 cases where people stated the presence of an 
asymmetrical or one-way relationship, and there were 16,625 cases where there was no 
relationship.  Given this low number of two-way or fully symmetrical relationships, I deemed 
it appropriate to reconsider the data set in terms of symmetry having two levels (as opposed 
to three).  Thus, I recoded people as either having a symmetric relationship (either fully 
symmetric or asymmetric) or as having no relationship.   
 Once the data was recoded in this manner, I was able to test this hypothesis using 
repeated measures analysis of variance with person and symmetry as factors.  The results of 
the ANOVA regression showed that the effect of symmetry was significant in two of the four 
situations as follows: For reasons related to resources, the main effect of symmetry yielded 
an F ratio of F (1, 16,834) = 3.2, p < .05 (one-tailed), indicating that the mean similarity 
score was significantly higher in the no symmetry condition (M = 1.32, SD = .704) than in 
the symmetry condition (M = 1.19, SD = .73).  For reasons related to goals, the F ratio was F 
(1, 16,834) = 3.88, p < .05, indicating that the mean similarity score for the no symmetry 
condition (M = .69, SD = .47) was significantly higher than the mean similarity score for the 
symmetry condition (M = .63, SD = .47).   In contrast, for reasons related to others, the main 
effect of symmetry yielded an F ratio of F (1, 16,834) = .02, p = n.s., indicating that the mean 
similarity score in the no symmetry condition (M = .87 SD = .59) was not significantly 
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different from the mean similarity score in the symmetry condition (M = .88 SD = .61 ).  For 
reasons related to fears, the main effect of symmetry yielded an F ratio of F (1, 16,834) = 
.765, p = n.s., again indicating that the mean similarity score in the no symmetry condition 
(M = 1.18, SD = .57) was not significantly different than the mean similarity score in the 
symmetry condition (M = 1.13, SD = .55).   
 The results of the analysis of variance also showed significant main effects for person 
as follows: for resources: F (183, 16,652) = 26.710, p < .001; for others: F (183, 16,652) = 
19.192, p < .001; for fears: F (183, 16,652) = 18.132, p < .001; for goals: F (183, 16,652) = 
26.946, p < .001.  These results verified the importance of controlling for person. 
 Overall, the results suggested partial support for a revised hypothesis that symmetry 
is positively related to the closeness of reasons, such that people who have any form of 
symmetry will be more similar on their reason scale scores than people who have no 
relationship.  This was particularly true for reasons related to goals and reasons related to 
resources.  
These results lend support to the idea that people who interact and communicate at 
work may come to share similar opinions over time.  Just as in the case of the results from 
H2—which revealed social influence effects from the most influential people as partially 
supported for certain types of reasons, it appears that similar effects are at play with H3A—
symmetry was related to the closeness of certain types of reasons.   
In the case of H3A, analysis of the results suggested that there were two types of 
reasons where similarity is affected by symmetry: 1) reasons related to resource issues and 2) 
reasons related to personal goals.  Follow-up qualitative investigations may be required to 
ascertain why people speak more frequently about these types of issues with others.  
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Self-Monitoring as a Moderator
Hypothesis 3B predicted that the relationship between symmetry and closeness of 
reason ratings would be stronger for people who were high self-monitors.  Therefore, I tested 
the construct of “self-monitoring” as a moderator of the effects of symmetry and the 
closeness of Time 2 scale scores for each reason category.  Because the moderator was a 
continuous variable, I switched from the ANOVA analyses and moved to testing the 
relationships and the moderator in a repeated measures regression (Baron & Kenny, 1986).  
In each regression I entered the variables in three steps using the same data described above.  
In the first step I entered the dummy codes for person and in the second step I entered the 
main effects for symmetry.  At this point in each analysis, the findings replicated the results 
from the ANOVA described previously.  In the third step I entered the interaction term.  In 
order to fully test for moderation I followed these steps for each of the four reason types.  
However, in all cases there was no significant effect for the interaction term (others: t
(16,311) = -1.39, p = n.s.; resources t (16,311) = -.302, p = n.s.; goals: t (16,311) = .118, p = 
n.s.; consequences: t (16,311) = 1.34, p = n.s.). Thus, analyses again revealed no support for 
the idea that in this sample, self-monitoring moderates the effects of influence. 
Employee Reason Types and Commitment to Change 
 Moving from findings about social influence effects related to discussions about a
change to an analysis of attitudes and behaviors related to enacting the change requires an 
analysis of reasons and commitment to change, as well as an analysis of how the three 
dimensions of this construct relate to behavioral outcomes. 
Specifically, testing the hypothesis (4A) that normative reasons will be positively and 
significantly related to affective commitment to change, or (4B) that informational reasons 
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will be positively and significantly related to continuance commitment to change, or (4C) 
that both normative and informational reasons will be positively and significantly related to 
normative commitment to change requires returning to the earlier categorizations of certain 
reason types as being normative or informational.  As stated at the opening of this chapter 
(and building upon the definitions of normative and informational presented earlier in 
chapters three and five), experts suggested that three types of reasons (Consequences, 
Resources, Goals) can be considered to be “informational” reasons (highly instrumental and 
logically-based), while one type (Others) can be considered as “normative” reasons 
(comparatively more socially-based and value-laden).   
 Using these classifications in regression equations with the three types of 
commitment produced different results for each type of commitment.  First, when I put all of 
the variables in a regression equation predicting affective commitment to change, support for 
H4A required that one of the reason types (Others) would be significantly related to affective 
commitment to change while three of the four reason types (the informational types of 
Resources, Goals, Consequences) would not be significantly related to affective commitment 
to change.  However, when I ran the regressions I found that all of the reason types were 
significantly and positively related to affective commitment to change (resources: b = -.108, t 
(183) = -2.27, p <.05; goals: b = .378, t (183) = 4.37, p < .01; consequences: b= -.129, t (183) 
= -2.20, p<.05; others: b = .137, t (183) = 1.92, p < .05 (one-tailed)).  Thus, while these 
results show more positive findings than expected and may trigger post-hoc discussions 
about the nature of affective commitment to change, H4A was partially supported.  In this 
analysis, normative reasons (although not alone) were positively and significantly related to 
affective commitment to change.  
77 
 In testing H4B, I included all of the reason types in a regression equation predicting 
continuance commitment to change, and then expected that three of the four reason types 
(Resources, Goals, Consequences) would be significantly related to continuance commitment 
to change while one type (Others) would not be significantly related to continuance 
commitment to change.  Regression results supported this finding (resources: b = .166, t
(183) = 2.83, p <.01; goals: b = -.184, t (183) = -1.73, p < .05 (one-tailed); consequences: b= 
.152, t (183) = 2.11, p<.05; others: b = -.139, t (183) = -1.58, p = n.s.).  These findings 
indicate that H4B was supported. 
 In order to test H4C, I regressed all of the reason types onto normative commitment 
to change.  In this case, to find support for H4C, I expected all of the reason types to be 
significantly and positively related to normative commitment to change.  However, only two 
of the four types were significantly and positively related to normative commitment to 
change (Resources and Goals).  Specifically, the results were: resources: b = .133, t (183) = 
2.17, p <.05; goals: b = .257, t (183) = 2.30, p < .05; consequences: b= -.019, t (183) = -.247, 
p= n.s.; others: b = .121, t (183) = 1.316, p = n.s.).  Since the reason categories that failed 
(Consequences and Others) were each from one of the two reason categories that were 
hypothesized to predict normative commitment to change, there is no support for H4C.   
 Overall, considering all three types of commitment to change, there was some support 
for the hypothesis that certain types of reasons relate to certain types of commitment to 
change – specifically, I did find that informational (logically-laden) reason types were related 
to continuance commitment to change and that normative reasons (socially-focused) were 
significantly related to affective commitment to change.  These findings suggested that 
logical concerns may drive continuance commitment to change (as previously suggested by 
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Herscovitch and Meyer (2002)), while logical and social/emotional concerns may be related 
to affective commitment to change. 
 Supplemental Analyses for Hypothesis Four
Recall that from either twelve or fifteen original items, each of the four reason scales 
(Others, Consequences, Goals, Resources) was created.  Then, the categories “normative” 
and “informational” were matched by experts to the resulting four reason scales.  Given that 
process, it could be argued that not every item that comprises the reason scales cleanly and 
clearly “maps” to definitions of “normative” and “informational.”   Thus, a more rigorous 
test of Hypothesis 4 could be made by returning to the original survey items, selecting only 
those items which most appropriately match the definitions of “normative” and 
“informational,” and then creating and testing scales comprised only of those items.   
 Accordingly, to further test the three aspects of Hypothesis Four, I moved from a 
scale-level investigation of informational and normative categories to an item-level 
investigation.  I returned to three subject-matter experts, and gave them a list of the items and 
a description of the two terms and their definitions. I asked the individuals to select items that 
they felt clearly met the definition of “informational” and items that clearly and cleanly met 
the definition of “normative.” In the analysis I only used the items where experts had 100% 
agreement.  I then aggregated these items to a scale level and used them in additional 
analyses.   In total, there were three items used to comprise the “normative” scale and there 
were six items used to comprise the “informational” scale.  The items and their 
classifications are listed in table 8.4 below.   
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Table 8.4 
Item Descriptions and Category Classifications for Supplemental Tests of Hypothesis 4 
 
Item Description Reason Category 
(Normative or 
Informational) 
Authority figures whom I respect really support this program. Normative 
Feedback I have heard from other parts of the hospital 
suggest the RRT program is good. 
Normative 
Peers whom I respect are very positive and really support the 
RRT program. 
Normative 
I don’t think the program can succeed until we have more 
FTE (full time employees). 
Informational 
This does not have enough resources. Informational 
I don’t think we can activate this properly. Informational 
It allows us to catch problems before they become 
overwhelming. 
Informational 
It provides advanced assessment and intervention training for 
me. 
Informational 
The RRT program can decrease a patient’s length of stay. Informational 
Results from supplemental analyses performed using these items aggregated to a 
scale level revealed strong support for H4A, 4B, and 4C.  Specifically, in performing the 
simultaneous regressions, I found that normative reasons were significantly and positively 
related to affective commitment to change, but informational reasons were not (normative: b 
= .41, t (183) = 6.94, p < .01; informational: b = -.037, t (183) = -.474, p = n.s.).  This 
indicates full support of H4A. 
 Similarly, results from a simultaneous regression of the reason types onto continuance 
commitment to change revealed that both reason types were positively and significantly 
related (normative: b = -.35, t (183) = -5.06, p < .01; informational: b = .201, t (183) = 2.22, 
p < .05).  Again, because both types of reasons (and not just informational reasons) were 
significantly related to continuance commitment to change, H4B was partially supported. 
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 Thus far in these supplemental analyses, the results have been similar to the 
regression results obtained from the regressions using the original reason scales.  However, 
in investigating the relationship between the new scales and normative commitment to 
change, the results are no longer similar to those from earlier investigations.  Whereas earlier 
analyses showed no support for H4C (because one scale from each of the reason types was 
not related to normative commitment to change), results provided support for H4C.  Here, as 
hypothesized, both types of reasons were related to normative commitment to change 
(normative: b = .193, t (183) = 2.78, p < .01; informational: b = .281, t (183) = 3.09, p < .01).  
Thus, with the adjusted reason scales, both normative and informational reasons were 
positively and significantly related to normative commitment to change, results which 
supported H4C. 
 Taken together, the results of these supplemental analyses indicated even stronger 
support for the idea that for all three types of commitment to change, certain types of reasons 
were related to certain types of commitment – specifically, informational reasons were 
related to continuance commitment to change, normative reasons were related to affective 
commitment to change, and both types were related to normative commitment to change. 
 These tests evaluated how reason types related to commitment to change, and laid the 
foundation to explore how commitment to change is related to implementation behaviors.  
The hypothesized relationships between these variables are outlined below. 
Relationships Between Commitment to Change and Implementation Behaviors 
 In order to test the relationships between different types of commitment to change 
and different implementation behaviors, I returned to the descriptive statistics.  Hypothesis 
5A predicted that there would be a significant correlation between all three types of 
81 
commitment to change and the implementation behavior of compliance.  Inspection of the 
correlations in Table 8.2 reveals the following correlations between compliance and the three 
types of commitment to change: Affective commitment to change (r = .343, p < .01); 
Normative commitment to change (r = .072, p = n.s); Continuance commitment to change (r 
= -.221, p < .01).  However, the results for normative commitment to change and compliance 
were non-significant, and thus there was only partial support for H5A.  
 In order to follow-up this with regression results, and in order to test Hypothesis 5B 
(that only affective and normative commitment to change will be positively related to 
discretionary behaviors (such as cooperation and championing) and that continuance 
commitment to change will be unrelated, or negatively related to cooperation and 
championing) I chose to run two regressions—one each for cooperation and for 
championing.  The results of regressing the commitment to change types onto cooperation 
indicated that affective commitment to change and continuance commitment to change 
behaved as expected, but there was a non-significant relationship between normative 
commitment to change and the dependent variable (affective commitment to change: b =
.248, t (183) = 3.4, p < .01; continuance commitment to change: b = -.164, t (183) = -2.57, p 
< .01; normative commitment to change: b = .052, t (183) = .97, p = n.s.).  These results 
showed partial support for H5B as it related to cooperation. As expected, continuance 
commitment to change was negatively related to cooperation with the change, and affective 
commitment to the change was positively related to cooperation with the change.  Only 
normative commitment to change did not behave as expected in relation to cooperation as the 
dependent variable.  These findings for affective and continuance commitment to change 
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replicate the direction and nature of similar relationships studied in related settings 
(Herscovitch & Meyer, 2002).   
 In changing the analysis to investigate the relationship between all three types of 
commitment to change and that of championing for the change (arguably a more intensified 
form of discretionary implementation behavior) the results were improved as compared to the 
results for cooperation (interestingly, cooperation seems a milder form of discretionary 
implementation support).  In this case, all three types of commitment to change were 
significantly related to championing implementation behaviors, and continuance commitment 
remained negatively related to championing behaviors (affective commitment to change: b =
.336, t (183) = 4.51, p < .01; continuance commitment to change: b = -.225, t (183) = -3.46, p 
< .01; normative commitment to change: b = .113, t (183) = 2.02, p < .05.).  The findings for 
championing behaviors were even stronger than the findings for cooperative behaviors.   
 Taken together, these results showed full support for H5B in terms of championing 
and partial support for H5B in terms of cooperation.  In all cases, continuance commitment to 
change was negatively related to all types of discretionary implementation behaviors—both 
cooperation and championing.  Again, this result is consistent with results from previous 
studies using the commitment to change construct (Herscovitch & Meyer, 2002).  A full 
summary of all hypothesized relationships and the results of the hypothesis tests is found in 
Figure 8.0 below. 
83 
Figure 8.0  
 Report of Hypotheses and Results 
H1A: Employee-elicited reasons for and against a change can be coded into five categories: technical, referent, 
normative, performance, and social. No support for five categories. However there were two
categories in reasons “for” and two in reasons “against.”
H1B: A second-level of analysis of employee-elicited reasons for and against a change will result in two 
higher-level factors; such factors can be considered as normative and informational. No support. The
normative and informational categories were found with the adjusted reason types from H1A.
H2A: The Time 2 reasons of the person given the highest influence rating by the respondent will significantly 
predict the Time 2 reasons of the respondent, even controlling for Time1 reasons of the respondent.  
Partial support : True for reasons related to “resources” and “others.”
H2B:  Self-monitoring will moderate the hypothesized relationship between the Time 2 reasons of the person 
given the highest influence and the T2 reasons of the respondent, such that the relationship will be 
stronger when the respondent is a high self-monitor. No support.
H3A: The degree of symmetry will be positively related to the closeness of reasons, such that the reasons of 
people in symmetrical relationships will be the most similar to each other, the reasons of people in 
asymmetric relationships will be less similar, and the reasons of people with no relationship will be the 
least similar. Partial support: True for reasons related to “resources” and “goals.”
H3B: Self-monitoring will moderate the effects of relationship symmetry and the closeness of reason ratings, 
such that the strength of the hypothesized relationships between levels of respondent symmetry and 
closeness of reason ratings will be stronger when the respondent is a high self-monitor.  No support .
H4A: Normative reasons will be positively related to affective commitment to change. Partial support: (Both
reason types were positively related). Full support in supplemental analysis.
H4B: Informational reasons will be positively related to continuance commitment to change. Supported, then 
partially supported in supplemental analysis.
H4C: Both normative and informational reasons will be positively related to normative commitment to change. 
No support in first analyses; full support in supplemental analysis.
H5A: Affective, normative, and continuance commitment to change will correlate positively with the focal 
behavior (compliance with the requirements for change). Partial support (no correlation for normative 
commitment and compliance).
H5B: Only affective and normative commitment to change will be positively related to discretionary behavior 
(cooperation and championing).  Continuance commitment to change will be unrelated, or negatively 
related to discretionary behaviors. Full support in terms of championing; Partial Support in terms of 
cooperation (there was no relationship between normative commitment to change and 
cooperation).
Change is 
introduced. 
Consider 
person most 
influential in 
this context;
note reasons 
endorsed by 
that person.  
Be swayed by 
those reasons. 
H2A,2B, 
H3A, 3B 
Feel 
uncertainty.  
 
Look to 
others to 
resolve 
uncertainty. 
Hear 
reasons for 
and against 
the change 
from many 
sources at 
work.  
(Reasons 
have 
categories). 
H1A, H1B 
Different 
reasons lead 
to different 
types of 
commitment 
to change: 
Affective 
Normative 
Continuance 
 
H4A, 4B, 4C 
Different types 
of commitment 
to change lead 
to different 
implementation 
behaviors:  
Compliance 
Cooperation 
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H5A, 5B 
Results:
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Discussion 
As business environments continue to be marked by rapid changes—both 
technological and social—managers and employees increasingly need to develop 
competencies in change management.  More specifically, change management efficacy 
requires that managers and employees become adept at understanding implementation 
behaviors.  As mentioned at the outset of this paper, research suggests that implementation 
failure occurs when employers fail to gain employees’ “skilled, consistent, and committed 
program or product use” (Klein et al., 2001).  Essentially, this definition implies that change 
implementation has a “people” component as well as a “technology” component—and thus 
the definition invites further inspection of intra- and inter-individual processes that may 
relate to change.  Given this background, I chose to examine the commitment element of 
change implementation, and then to look at implementation in terms of specific discretionary 
behaviors (compliance, cooperation, and championing).  The purpose of this paper was to 
uniquely combine existing theories in order to extend our understanding of how reasons, 
dyadic social influence, and commitment to change interrelate to result in different 
implementation outcomes. 
 Specifically, I combined Behavioral Reasons Theory, social network theory, and 
recent work on attitudinal antecedents to implementation in order to link employee-generated 
reasons to commitment to change and to implementation behaviors.  I proposed and tested 
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specific linkages in a process model relating dyadic influence, commitment to change, and 
implementation.   
In this dissertation, I argued that categorizing employee-generated reasons for and 
against a change would significantly increase our understanding of how employees consider 
and relate to change initiatives.  I noted that current attempts at organizing employee 
responses to change have been idiosyncratic and atheoretical (Rousseau & Tijoriwala, 1999); 
and that they often focus solely on manager-generated accounts (Bies & Shapiro, 1993).  In 
order to improve this situation, I looked to the socialization and information-seeking 
literatures which indicate that during socialization, employees seek out five categories of 
information.  I drew from this literature and suggested that employees in a change situation 
would similarly generate responses (or reasons) in five categories, and suggested that reasons 
for and against a change could be categorized similarly.  Results from factor analyses 
indicate that the five categories I named were not applicable to this sample or in the context 
of this change.  However, results indicated that categories of reasons do exist, and that these 
categories could be used in additional analyses.  In particular, results indicate that it may be 
possible to identify “informational” and “normative” categories of reasons (importantly, 
these categories could stem from reasons “for” a change as well as from reasons “against” a 
change).  The advances possible with categorization allow researchers to more systematically 
study reactions to organizational change.   
Using these categories of reasons, it was possible to investigate how reason types may 
“move” through the work environment over time—particularly in dyadic social exchanges.  I 
found some support for the suggestion that over time, the reasons of the most influential 
people are significantly related to the reasons of the employees who rated them as 
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influential—even controlling for the original reasons of the employees.  These findings were 
supported for reasons related to resource issues and for reasons related to the opinions of 
others.   
I suggest that these findings have significant face validity in light of the content of the 
items that comprised the reason categories.  Given that in this sample, the influential people 
have information and opinions about finances, resources, staffing, funding, and allocation 
issues (all “resource” issues), their opinions  on these matters could be considered highly 
credible and salient—and thus convincing enough to sway others to have similar opinions.   
Similar arguments could be made regarding the items that comprise the “others” 
reason type.  Specifically, the influential people in this sample have mobility in the ranks of 
this hierarchical organization, and thus could be a credible and salient source for information 
on how other hospitals, other departments, and respected superiors feel about the change.  
The data available from this research is not sufficient to allow testing of the specific levels of 
credibility of people or to test the salience of particular arguments, but findings from this 
research do indicate that such investigations would have significant value.   
It is appropriate to comment upon the two reason types where the reasons of the 
influential others were not significantly related to the reason types of the employees who 
rated them.  The two types that did not reach significance were labeled “consequences” and 
“goals.”  Inspection of the items comprising these reason types suggests clues as to why they 
were not significantly influenced by others.  Specifically, these items reference intra-
individual concerns, rather than inter-individual concerns.  Potentially, employees discussing 
this particular change in this environment were more prone to value external input (input 
from superiors/influential others) about external issues (issues with empirical foundations 
87 
versus more internally emotional and personal ones).  Again, these implications merit further 
investigation and suggest possibilities for future research relating employee reason categories 
to these and to other dependent variables. 
 Concerning other effects for reason types and social influence, my results also 
indicated preliminary support for the idea that relationship symmetry is related to similarity 
of reasons.  More specifically, the significant results for reasons related to “resources” and 
“personal goals” indicated that people in relationships with others (whether the relationship 
was two-way or one-way) had more similar reason scores over time in these two categories.  
These results are similar to the findings described above for the effects of influential people 
over time, and in fact, the significance of the “resources” reason category is common to both 
investigations.  Where the two findings differ is in the case of the reason category called 
“goals”—which was significant for symmetry but was not significant previously in regards to 
influential people and their ratings.  This difference invites closer inspection of the items that 
comprise the “goals” reason category, as well as inspection of demographic information on 
the names that people listed in the symmetry data.   
Inspection of item content on the “goals” reason category and follow-up research on 
the actual names that respondents listed in the survey illuminates that the symmetry data set 
was primarily comprised of peer-to-peer relations.  Instead of comparing people to the 
individual they found most influential (usually a superior—as was done in the first 
comparison), this second comparison was between an individual and up to eight other 
individuals who they named as having some amount of communication and influence.  Since 
managers or supervisors could be mixed in this data set, I inspected the actual names given in 
response to this portion of the survey and corroborated that these people were 
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overwhelmingly peers (77% of the data set was comprised of peer nurses and 23% of the data 
set was comprised of names of supervisors and nurse managers).   
 Taken together, this information suggests a possible explanation for why there was a 
significant relationship for symmetry and similarity of reason ratings related to “goals.”   It is 
possible that people trusted information and input from peers (similar others) in matters that 
relate to intra-individual concerns.  Specifically, the items in the “goals” category covered 
issues such as “this is good training for me,” and “this allows me to catch problems before 
they become overwhelming.”  Such items speak to issues that peers could relate to, and speak 
convincingly about, and thus could potentially influence more easily than superiors could.  
Future qualitative and quantitative research could more fully investigate these suggestions. 
 In light of these positive results, it is also important to address the role that self-
monitoring did not play as a moderating variable in the relationships mentioned above.  
Informal queries directed at nurses who completed the survey, as well as perusal of the 
comments nurses added to the survey, revealed that there was significant resistance to the 
self-monitoring items.  The self-monitoring items were considered intrusive and they were 
not considered relevant to the study of Rapid Response Teams.  Also, according to the nurses 
who shared their post-survey reactions via email (n = 5), the items appeared at a point in the 
survey where respondents were becoming quite fatigued.  This information may help explain 
the lower coefficient alpha (.65) and it may also at least partially explain why self-monitoring 
did not reach significance as a moderator of these relationships.   
 However, a more compelling explanation for the lack of significance for this variable 
may be found after inspecting the nature of the sample.  The mean level of self-monitoring 
for the sample was 6.9 (out of a potential 18), indicating that overall, the sample is comprised 
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of low-self monitors (a score of 9 or above would constitute a person as a medium- to high- 
self monitor. The highest score even recorded in the sample was 15).  Given that nurses must 
constantly share information in a matter-of-fact manner during the course of their jobs, and 
given that some self-monitoring behaviors (i.e. providing misleadingly positive information, 
or “telling people what they want to hear”) could actually be detrimental to patient and 
family stability and well-being, it is not surprising that the sample of nurses was heavily 
comprised of low self monitors.  The construct could not reach significance if it was not 
sufficiently present in the sample.  Thus, while this variable was not significant for this 
sample, it may still be of significant value in other research populations.  Because of its 
relevance in other research settings (Burkhardt, 1994; Mehra et al., 2001; Pollock et al. 
2000), it seems too early to reject this potential moderator based on findings from this sample 
alone. 
 Self-monitoring effects aside, the finding that the reason ratings of influential others 
significantly related to the reason ratings of employees supports the suggestion that reasons 
may be one type of social information that is exchanged in interactions at work.  Combined 
with the finding that symmetry affects the similarity of reason ratings (for certain types of 
reasons), these findings indicated preliminary support for the suggestion that social influence 
effects were in play when it comes to reasons.  Further research is required to explain when 
and why certain types of reasons have these differential effects, but the data from this 
research indicated that social influence effects were related to reasons, that reasons were a 
viable research topic, and that such further research on relationship moderators may have 
merit. 
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 However, validating the idea that employee-generated reasons may have categories, 
and that reasons and their categories are elements of social comparison and social exchange 
was only one of the goals of this research.  Reasons were inspected in their own right as well 
as in the context that they might be related to different types of commitment to change.  The 
value of this work for managers and practitioners lies in testing the hypotheses relating 
certain reason types to certain types of commitment to change.  The commitment to change 
literature is relatively new, and some of the findings related to that literature are preliminary.  
In particular, little is known about the differences in the nature of affective, normative, and 
continuance commitment to change.  Thus, the findings in this research help to build the 
commitment to change literature.  Overall, findings from these analyses suggest that affective 
commitment to change is predicted by informational reason types; that continuance 
commitment to change is also related to the informational reason type; and that normative 
commitment to change is related to both the informational and normative reason types.  The 
implications of these findings suggest that different cognitive processes may be in play in 
predicting commitment to change—it may be that socio-emotional reasons can better predict 
affective commitment; that logical reasons may be more predictive of continuance 
commitment; and that either type can predict normative commitment.   
 More conservative results suggested slightly different findings—namely that 1) both 
informational and normative reasons can lead to affective commitment to change and 2) that 
neither significantly relates to normative commitment to change.  Implications from both sets 
of findings taken together indicate that managers may encourage affective commitment by 
taking either a logical or a socio-emotional approach with reasons, with the caution that 
strictly logical approach (while having a potential effect on affective commitment) clearly 
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has a relationship with continuance commitment to change.   Since most managers want to 
engender affective commitment, it is critical to follow this research with more specific 
investigations about whether certain reasons have the potential to help an individual move 
past continuance commitment to change and move towards affective commitment to change.  
The results from these findings are inconclusive for normative commitment, providing 
evidence to support arguments questioning the value of the normative commitment to change 
construct (Meyer, Allen, & Smith, 1993). 
 All three of the commitment to change constructs were tested in relation to 
implementation behaviors.  Previous research indicated that all three types of commitment to 
change would be related to compliance.  However, this was not true for this sample.  In this 
dissertation, my findings were that only affective and continuance commitment (and 
continuance was in the negative direction) were significantly related to compliance.  This 
difference in findings may have something to do with differences in how “compliance” is 
measured (it is a three-item measure that makes no reference to the specific change as it 
currently exists) and how it is defined and interpreted by respondents in this sample.  Recall 
that reactions to RRT were extreme and bifurcated in this sample (people either really wanted 
the change or were very much against it), and there was very little variety in what it takes to 
“comply.” Thus, other types of implementation behaviors (besides compliance) revealed 
more interesting findings.   
Specifically, affective commitment to change was positively and significantly related 
to cooperation and to championing, and continuance commitment was negatively and 
significantly related to both behaviors.  These findings corroborate other research findings, 
suggesting that managers may want to continue to encourage affective commitment to 
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change while minimizing levels of continuance commitment to change (Herscovitch et al., 
2002; Meyer et al., 1993).  These results also build the literature by indicating that for some 
changes, normative commitment to change may have significantly less value than either 
affective or continuance commitment to change —suggesting that managers may be more 
interested in managing the commitment extremes (affective commitment to change or 
continuance commitment to change) rather than managing a “middle road” (normative 
commitment to change).   
The results also suggest that future research into behavioral options such as resistance 
may be of value. 
Discussion of Research Findings 
 The first key contribution of this research is the relationship between certain reason 
types and social influence effects.    In this study, I considered four reason types (Resources, 
Goals, Others, Consequences) and looked at how employee ratings of these types changed 
over time in relation to the reason ratings of the most influential people, after controlling for 
original employee ratings.  I found support for the idea that for certain types of reasons (those 
related to resource issues and those related to opinions of others) there was a significant 
relationship between the opinions of influential and the later opinions of the employees who 
rated them as influential.  This finding should allow researchers to consider reasons as part of 
the “content” of social exchanges at work.  Researchers have indicated that, while we know a 
great deal about the type and strength of network ties and the frequency of network contact, 
we still do not know enough about the content of network exchanges (Monge & Contractor, 
2003; Monge & Eisenberg, 1987; Rice & Danowski, 1991b).  The results from this 
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dissertation suggested the viability of considering reasons as the content of some network 
exchanges.   
 In a related investigation, I also looked at how relationship symmetry affected 
similarity in reason ratings over time.  I found preliminary support for the idea that people 
who have at least one-way exchanges of information and influence have more similar reason 
ratings for two types of reasons (reasons related to resource and reasons related to goals).  
These findings build on the idea that reasons comprise at least some of the content of 
network exchanges, as well as suggest that some types of content flow more freely with some 
types of contacts.  These findings stimulate considerable questions appropriate for follow-up 
research on moderators of the influence relationship. The moderator I did test, self-
monitoring, was not significant for the sample.  However, the findings from this study 
suggest that other moderators, such as ones related to network and content types, may be 
appropriate in future studies.   
 A second key contribution of this study is the suggestion that reasons for and against 
supporting a change may have categories.  The study of employee reactions to change, and 
the study of employee-generated responses to change in the form of motivated reasoning, 
lacks consistency.  In this study, I tested categories of reason based on two underlying 
dimensions of information-giving: “normative” and “informational.”  The application of 
reason categories, potentially those of “informational” and “normative,” brings a theory-
based approach to this field that could provide a systematic way for researchers to study 
changes that were previously too disparate for comparison.   
 A third contribution of this work is in what it does to build the commitment to change 
literature.  There is considerable need to investigate antecedents to commitment, and more 
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specifically antecedents to commitment to change (Herscovitch et al., 2002; Meyer & Allen, 
1991; Meyer et al., 1993; Meyer, Stanley, Herscovitch, & Topolnytsky, 2002).  This paper 
breaks new ground by investigating whether certain types of reasons could be antecedents to 
certain types of commitment to change.  In particular, findings were more conclusive for two 
of the three types of commitment to change.  Results showed that informational and 
normative reasons significantly related to affective commitment to change, while 
informational reasons related significantly (and negatively) to continuance commitment.  
Results were somewhat inconclusive for normative commitment to change, perhaps a result 
idiosyncratic to this sample.  However, the fact that normative commitment to change was 
not salient for this sample or for this change is a contribution in its own right—as it 
encourages researchers to investigate whether there are other changes where normative 
commitment to the change is not a viable outcome. 
 A fourth contribution of this work stems from the fact that it evaluates change 
efficacy by looking at implementation behaviors.  Many previous investigations of changes 
simply use dichotomous variables to denote implementation or a lack thereof (Cooper & 
Zmud, 1990; Dickerson & Gentry, 1983) In contrast, this work asks employees to respond to 
items that allowed me to categorize their reactions in terms of behaviors.  I investigated 
outcomes such as compliance, cooperation, and championing.  In finding that affective 
commitment to change was positively related to cooperation and championing, this work 
underscores the importance of building and encouraging affective commitment to change 
(and because earlier results show which types of reasons related to affective commitment, 
researchers can now begin to trace how such commitment to change develops over time).  I 
also found that continuance commitment to change was negatively related to cooperation and 
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to championing—again underscoring results from previous (preliminary) findings suggesting 
that managers and practitioners need to continue to de-emphasize continuance commitment 
to change in some situations (Herscovitch & Meyer, 2002).   
 The results of this study provided some evidence that reasons constituted the content 
of social exchanges at work, both between employees and their superiors as well as between 
employees and their peers.  Results essentially suggest that “people who interact together, 
begin to think together” – at least in regards to some issues.  While similar conclusions have 
been drawn from previous research on social information processing, previous findings were 
in relation to similarity of aggregate attitudinal measures, rather than related to the similarity 
of actual reasons for or against a change. 
 A potential limitation of this study is that it was not longitudinal in design.  Instead, 
due to limitations at the research site, it was only possible to ask for retrospected opinions. 
While I followed established protocols for this type of research (Schwarz, 2000), this work 
was done based upon recollected contrasts rather than upon information taken from 
questionnaires administered at two different points in time.  In pursuing future research, 
researchers should instead attempt to gather “time one” information just prior to or 
immediately after a change is initiated and “time two” data at six-month (or change-
appropriate) intervals thereafter.   
 Other limitations are 1) that the behavioral outcome variables are taken from self-
report data and 2) the project relied on a single method for data collection.  Both of these can 
threaten the validity of results (cf. Moorman & Podsakoff, 1992).  Reliance on self-reported 
data may influence study findings in that individuals may engage in cognitive conservation 
(which would inflate the relationships between the variables in the study measures) and/or in 
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that individuals may be lenient in reporting their behavioral responses due to self-
presentation biases (Furst, 2005; Harrison & McLaughlin, 1996).  Further, when data are 
based on one method of measurement (e.g., a survey) findings may be contaminated by 
shared method variance (Schmitt, 1994; Spector, 1994).   
However, much of the data in this dissertation relied on independent data sources (i.e. 
for the “most influential” ratings, I used those people’s actual ratings, not perceptions of their 
ratings).  Reliance on self-report data only occurred for the behavioral variable.  Such 
reliance was not planned, but was necessary given the limitations at the hospital data site. I
was not allowed to ask external parties to rate individual behaviors due to administrative 
concern about respondent fatigue and due to administrative resistance to the idea.  For future 
work in similar sites, researchers should negotiate external rating opportunities to include 
peer or supervisor ratings of employee responses to change (Borman, 1991).  Other options 
are to negotiate alternative forms of data collection, such as interviews, observation, or 
controlled experiments involving case-based scenarios (Furst, 2005).   Given the fact that 
nurses at this teaching hospital were not allowed to be interviewed during working hours, and 
given that nurses had already given of their “free time” to do the survey, these options were 
not possible at this research site. 
 Despite these facts, previous research on change efficacy has established that there 
is a role for employee accounts about the viability of a change (Shapiro et al., 1994).  
Importantly, for some changes, employee perceptions of their own behavioral reactions may 
be an outcome deserving of merit in its own right (Rousseau et al., 1999).  Also, in the case 
of this research, employees had very little reason to exaggerate or downplay their behavioral 
reactions because the change in question has obvious and dichotomous behavioral options 
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(nurses either opt to wear the pager or they don’t).  Despite this, future researchers should 
work to mitigate potential problems with self-report and single-source data collection. 
Implications for Researchers 
 In addition to the contributions already noted, this study suggests valuable avenues 
for future research. First, regarding the study of reasons, it seems necessary to test the 
suggested normative and informational categories in additional settings, ensuring that with 
other types of changes and in other samples, the use of the categories is both viable and 
meaningful.  More specifically, the value of categorizing reasons (introduced here) increases 
significantly if reasons and reason categories can be linked to hierarchical positions, 
communication patterns, and ultimately to types of behaviors in future research.  No work 
using Behavioral Reasons Theory of which I am aware has attempted to categorize reasons or 
to relate categories to other variables of interest, and doing so may be of value to future 
researchers interested in bringing consistency and theory to the study of employee reactions.  
This paper suggests that it may be possible to use normative and informational categories in 
other research contexts. 
 Secondly, as mentioned earlier, future research needs to be done on why certain 
reason categories were susceptible to social influence effects and why others were not.  I 
have made several suggestions regarding network content, source credibility, and source 
salience that could be tested empirically.  The results would potentially be of value to, and 
would further improve, the study of the social accounts and motivated reasoning literatures in 
particular. 
 Thirdly, and further regarding the search for moderators, self-monitoring should not 
be removed from future investigations.  Because this sample may be unusual in its 
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composition, future research should be used to corroborate or refute the non-significant 
findings here. 
 Fourthly, future research is required to refine and improve the definitions of 
commitment to change in relation to definitions of organizational commitment.  Because 
there is limited work to date using the commitment to change constructs, and because the 
only published work I was able to find (Herscovitch & Meyer, 2002) evaluated many 
different changes rather than one particular change (as was evaluated in this dissertation), it 
may be valuable to do more work investigating reactions to the same change (a control) so 
that these dissertation findings can better be compared with future research. 
 Finally, future research on behavioral responses such as active and passive resistance 
may be valuable in understanding the full range of reactions to change.  Because resistors 
may have significant influence in the social network, and their reasons may be compelling to 
certain audiences, it seems valuable to include a wider range of behavioral response options 
in future studies of organizational change implementation.  Such studies would be of value to 
researchers as well as to managers and practitioners.  Other implications for managers are 
outlined immediately below. 
Implications for Managers 
 One potentially valuable aspect of this dissertation lies in the number of implications 
these findings have for the managers and practitioners who are working toward change 
implementation.  Firstly, this study identifies context-specific (item-level) reasons for and 
against a particular change.  New studies using a similar design would result in item-level 
means and standard deviations for every reason used in the study.  Such descriptive statistics 
could give managers a sense of exactly which reasons are “popular” and which reasons seem 
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to have traction among the employee base.  Only managers have the perspective to compare 
the reasons they emphasized and the reasons they sought to promote with the reasons that are 
actually circulating in the work environment.  Managers armed with such data can then 
proceed with interventions, particularly marketing and communication-based interventions 
aimed at 1) further emphasizing current opinions, and/or 2) de-emphasizing incorrect (or 
reasons out of favor with management’s opinion), and/or 3) potentially adding new reasons 
to the environment.   
 Secondly, this research suggests that changes can also be studied at a macro level by 
comparing reason categories rather than comparing items.  The reason categories I identified 
here (normative and informational) may be of value to managers doing macro-level analyses 
of change reactions, or to managers who are attempting to relate reasons to other variables of 
interest in their workplace. 
 Thirdly, managers can also benefit from the new information about the three types of 
commitment to change.  In particular, while affective commitment to change by definition 
holds intuitive value, its presence and actual value has not been routinely tested in applied 
field settings.  No other research of which I am aware has shown affective commitment to 
change (the most valuable kind of commitment to change in relation to behavioral outcomes) 
to be related to informational and normative reasons.  The fact that continuance commitment 
to change (the least valuable kind and the least predictive of managerially-preferred 
outcomes) also is significantly and negatively related to informational reasons implies that 
managers may need to be particularly careful when using informational reasons to promote 
change.  It appears that managers who heavily rely on informational reasons to promote 
change have the potential to inculcate affective commitment to change, while at the same 
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time they have the potential to inculcate the less desirable continuance commitment to 
change.  Again, this work suggests that managers may want to invest more time in 
understanding which reasons (and which people) encourage the normative reasons which can 
encourage affective commitment to change. 
 A final possible benefit for managers who chose to replicate this research design in 
their own contexts is that it has the potential to reveal the actual names of the influential 
people in the workforce.  Such information, when properly and ethically collected, can allow 
managers to pinpoint certain individuals in order to ask them for more assistance or to 
dissuade them from current thinking that might be detrimental to managerial goals.  Such 
data was not released to the client at this data site due to ethical considerations and a fear that 
in this environment, using names would decrease the response rate.  However, under the right 
conditions and with appropriate forewarning, this type of research could yield important 
individual-level network data that would allow managers to design interventions at the 
micro-individual level—thus helping them to create more champions or to pinpoint and 
dissuade resistors. 
Conclusion  
 In summary, the results of this study provide preliminary evidence that employees use 
reasons as part of the content of their social exchanges in relation to a change.  In particular, 
there is evidence suggesting that different types of reasons may be the content of exchanges 
with different types of network partners (superiors versus peers in this example), and that 
different types of reasons relate to different types of commitment to change.  Importantly, 
there is evidence that informational and normative reasons relate to affective commitment to 
change—which is potentially the most valuable type in predicting implementation behaviors 
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such as cooperation and championing.  This research improves upon previous studies of 
social information processing and network mechanisms by establishing that reasons may be 
one element of network content. Further, by linking certain reasons to certain commitment to 
change types, this work makes a contribution to the implementation literature.  The findings 
should be useful to managers charged with implementing change, as well as to researchers 
interested in the value of reasons, the intra- and inter-individual level antecedents and 
consequences of commitment to change, and the antecedents of implementation behaviors. 
APPENDIX 
 
Survey Instrument Text 
 
Part I: Reasons For and Against Supporting Rapid Response Teams 
 
In this section, you will be given a list of potential reasons for supporting or not supporting the Rapid Response 
Team program at UNCH. Please rate them using the scales below. Because I am also interested in how people 
change their opinions over time, I ask you how you felt about the initiative when you first heard about it.  When 
you see the question repeated, please try to think back to how you felt when you first heard of the Rapid 
Response Team initiative. Try to recall where you lived and worked, what your tasks were at the time, and how 
you felt at that time. Respond using your recollection of your reasons for supporting the initiative at that time.  
 
Instructions: From the list below, indicate how you felt originally about the reasons for supporting the Rapid 
Response Team initiative at UNCH, then please answer the same question while thinking about how you feel 
now .Reasons Why You Do Support (or Would Support) the Rapid Response Team Program at UNCH: 
 
1. It allows me to catch problems before they become overwhelming. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neither 
Agree or 
Disagree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
How I Felt Originally ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
How I Feel Now ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
2. It decreases the acuity of the patient that may “end up” in ICU. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neither 
Agree or 
Disagree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
How I Felt Originally ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
How I Feel Now ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
3. It provides advanced assessment and intervention training for me. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neither 
Agree or 
Disagree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
How I Felt Originally ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
How I Feel Now  ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
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4. Having the RRT available improves patient outcomes.  
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neither 
Agree or 
Disagree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
How I Felt Originally ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
How I Feel Now  ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
5. It provides advanced assessment and intervention training for others- such as the people who make the call or 
new nurses and new doctors who see the intervention.  
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neither 
Agree or 
Disagree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
How I Felt Originally ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
How I Feel Now  ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
6. It allows me to take better care of the patient- I don’t have to wait for someone to get back to me once I know 
there is a problem. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neither 
Agree or 
Disagree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
How I Felt Originally ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
How I Feel Now  ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
7. Peers whom I respect are very positive and really support the RRT program.   
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neither 
Agree or 
Disagree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
How I Felt Originally ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
How I Feel Now ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
8. Authority figures whom I respect really support this program. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neither 
Agree or 
Disagree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
How I Felt Originally ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
How I Feel Now ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
9. Feedback I have heard from other parts of the hospital suggest the RRT program is good. 
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Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neither 
Agree or 
Disagree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
How I Felt Originally ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
How I Feel Now ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
10. I finally have a way to get the assistance I need for my patient (in a timely manner). 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neither 
Agree or 
Disagree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
How I Felt Originally ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
How I Feel Now ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
11. I can get extra hands and help when I am unsure of a patient’s condition status. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neither 
Agree or 
Disagree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
How I Felt Originally ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
How I Feel Now  ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
12. RRT should be an integral part of a teaching hospital. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neither 
Agree or 
Disagree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
How I Felt Originally ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
How I Feel Now ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
13. The RRT program can decrease a patient’s length of stay. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neither 
Agree or 
Disagree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
How I Felt Originally ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
How I Feel Now ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
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14. The RRT program can expedite the patient’s progress to the appropriate destination. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neither 
Agree or 
Disagree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
How I Felt Originally ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
How I Feel Now ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
15. I have more autonomy as a caregiver. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neither 
Agree or 
Disagree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
How I Felt Originally  ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
How I Feel Now ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
Part II: Reasons Against Rapid Response Teams 
 
The next set of questions asks you about the reasons people might have for not supporting the Rapid Response 
Team program.  Please respond with how you felt when you first heard about the program and then respond 
with how you feel now.  
Instructions: From the list below, please indicate how you felt when you first heard about the Rapid Response 
Team (RRT) initiative, then answer with how you feel about RRT now.  Rate your reactions using the scale 
below. Reasons You Do Not (or Would Not) Support the Rapid Response Team Program at UNCH: 
 
1. We don’t have enough nurses to operationalize this program well. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Niether 
Agree or 
Disagree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
How I Felt Originally ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
How I Feel Now ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
2. I feel that other healthcare providers are judging me for making the call. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Niether 
Agree or 
Disagree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
How I Felt Originally ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
How I Feel Now ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
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3. It is intimidating to call in all that experience, all those people. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Niether 
Agree or 
Disagree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
How I Felt Originally ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
How I Feel Now ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
4. I am not sure what happens if I make a mistake about the call. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neither 
Agree or 
Disagree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
How I Felt Originally ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
How I Feel Now ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
5. I fear that the RR team might point at me and ask me why I made the call. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neither 
Agree or 
Disagree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
How I Felt Originally ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
How I Feel Now ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
6. I don’t like the idea of sending the message that I don’t trust the doctor. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neither 
Agree or 
Disagree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
How I Felt Originally ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
How I Feel Now ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
7. This could lead to less trust on the floor rather than more trust. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neither 
Agree or 
Disagree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
How I Felt Originally ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
How I Feel Now ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
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8. This does not have enough resources. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neither 
Agree or 
Disagree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
How I Felt Originally ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
How I Feel Now ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
9. The administration does not provide the resources for me to participate properly. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neither 
Agree or 
Disagree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
How I Felt Originally ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
How I Feel Now ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
10. I don’t think the program can succeed until we have more FTEs. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neither 
Agree or 
Disagree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
How I Felt Originally ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
How I Feel Now ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
11. This is not/will not be judgment-free- no matter what they claim about the program. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Niether 
Agree or 
Disagree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
How I Felt Originally ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
How I Feel Now ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
12. I don’t think we can activate this program properly. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neither 
Agree or 
Disagree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
How I Felt Originally ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
How I Feel Now ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
Part III: Communication Networks at UNCH 
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Research shows that the informal communication patterns at work can be more important than communication 
through the formal channels.  This section helps me understand who talks to whom about what.  After I create a 
generic communication map, I destroy names and only report patterns and trends.  Feel free to contact me if you 
have any questions about this process (lisa_jones@unc.edu). 
 
Instructions:  
1. Considering the people you interact with at work and on your floor, please note the people who you talk to 
about work-related issues and changes such as RRT.  You can list as many people as you think are appropriate, 
but please consider at least your top five. 
 
2. Next, please rate them on how influential they are to you – meaning how much their opinion has the ability to 
affect your opinion (1 = an insignificant amount of influence and 5 = a great amount of influence).   
 
3. Lastly, (in case some ratings are tied) please note the person who you think has the greatest ability to affect 
your opinion about RRT. 
 
Name 1: 
Influence rating: 1 =Insignificant amount 2 =Small amount 3 =Moderate amount 4 =Considerable amount 5 
=Great amount 
Name 2: 
Influence rating: 1 =Insignificant amount 2 =Small amount 3 =Moderate amount 4 =Considerable amount 5 
=Great amount 
Name 3: 
Influence rating: 1 =Insignificant amount 2 =Small amount 3 =Moderate amount 4 =Considerable amount 5 
=Great amount 
Name 4: 
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Influence rating: 1 =Insignificant amount 2 =Small amount 3 =Moderate amount 4 =Considerable amount 5 
=Great amount 
Name 5: 
Influence rating: 1 =Insignificant amount 2 =Small amount 3 =Moderate amount 4 =Considerable amount 5 
=Great amount 
Name 6: 
Influence rating: 1 =Insignificant amount 2 =Small amount 3 =Moderate amount 4 =Considerable amount 5 
=Great amount 
Name 7: 
Influence rating: 1 =Insignificant amount 2 =Small amount 3 =Moderate amount 4 =Considerable amount 5 
=Great amount 
Name 8: 
Influence rating: 1 =Insignificant amount 2 =Small amount 3 =Moderate amount 4 =Considerable amount 5 
=Great amount 
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From the names above, please select who has the greatest ability to affect your opinion about RRT? 
 
1. Name 1 
2. Name 2 
3. Name 3 
4. Name 4 
5. Name 5 
6. Name 6 
7. Name 7 
8. Name 8 
 
Part IV. Commitment Measures 
 
This section asks about other reactions to the Rapid Response Team program, especially regarding how it might 
affect your work.  Some questions may sound similar, but they are slightly different- so please answer each one.   
 
Instructions: The following questions refer to the Rapid Response Team program (RRT).  Please respond using 
the scale below. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1. I believe in the value of this RRT program. ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
2. This program is a good strategy for this 
organization. ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
3. I think management is making a mistake by 
introducing this program.   ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
4. This program serves an important purpose.  ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
5. Things would be better without this program. ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
6. This program is not necessary. ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
7. I have no choice but to go along with this 
program. ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
8. I feel pressure to go along with this program. ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
9. I have too much at stake to resist this program. ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
10. It would be too costly for me to resist this 
program. ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
11. Resisting this program is not a viable option 
for me. ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
12. It would be risky to speak out against this 
program. ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
13. I feel a sense of duty to work toward this 
program. ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
14. I do not think it would be right for me to 
oppose this program. ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
15. I would not feel badly about opposing this 
program. ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
16. It would be irresponsible for me to resist this 
program. ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
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17. I would feel guilty about opposing this 
program.  ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
18. I do not feel any obligation to support this 
program. ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
Part V: Behavioral Responses to Change 
The following questions ask about how you behave (or would behave) regarding an organizational change or 
because of a new approach such as introducing Rapid Response Teams in your unit. 
 
Please respond the following items using the scale below. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neither 
Disagree or 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1. I comply with my organization’s directives 
regarding the RRT program. ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
2. I generally accept role changes. ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
3. I adjust the way I do my job as required by this 
RRT program. ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
4. I consistently work toward the objectives of 
this program. ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
5. I remain optimistic about this program, even in
the face of adversity. ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
6. I avoid former practices, even if they seem 
easier. ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
7. I would engage in behaviors related to the 
program that seem difficult in the short-term but 
that seem likely to have long-term benefits. 
❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
8. I seek further information concerning the 
program when needed. ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
9. I don’t complain about the program. ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
10. I try to keep myself informed about the RRT 
program. ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
11. In general, I am tolerant of temporary 
disruptions and/or ambiguities in my job. ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
12. I encourage the participation of others in the 
program. ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
13. I speak positively about the program to co-
workers. ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
14. I speak positively about the program to 
outsiders. ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
15. I try to find ways to overcome difficulties 
associated with the program. ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
16. I persevere with the change in order to 
support the goals of this program. ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
17. I try to overcome co-workers resistance 
toward the program. ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
Part VI. Personal Characteristics- Individual Differences: 
The answers to the following questions help me understand how different personality types deal with change.  
Please answer the questions openly and honestly, as there is no “ideal” answer.   
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Instructions: Read each statement and select whether the statement is true or false for you. 
 
True False 
1. I can make impromptu speeches even on topics about which I 
have almost no information. ❏ ❏
2. I find it hard to imitiate the behavior of other people. ❏ ❏
3. At parties and social gatherings, I do not attempt to say or do 
things that others will like. ❏ ❏
4. I can only argue for ideas which I already believe. ❏ ❏
5. I guess I put on a show to impress or entertain others.  ❏ ❏
6. I would probably make a good actor. ❏ ❏
7. In a group of people I am rarely the center of attention. ❏ ❏
8. In different situations and with different people, I often act like 
very different persons. ❏ ❏
9. I am not particularly good at making other people like me. ❏ ❏
10. I’m not always the person I appear to be. ❏ ❏
11. I would not change my opinions (or the way I do things) in order 
to please someone or win their favor. ❏ ❏
12. I have considered being an entertainer. ❏ ❏
13. I have never been good at games like charades or 
improvisational acting. ❏ ❏
14. I have trouble changing my behavior to suit different people and 
different situations. ❏ ❏
15. At a party, I let others keep the stories and jokes going. ❏ ❏
16. I feel a bit awkward in public and do not show up quite as well 
as I should. ❏ ❏
17. I can look anyone in the eye and tell a lie with a straight face (if 
for a right end). ❏ ❏
18. I may deceive people by being friendly when I really dislike 
them. ❏ ❏
Part VII: Demographics and Control Variables 
Gender: 
1. Male 
2. Female 
Tenure: How long have you been working as a nurse?  
1. Less than one year 
2. 1 - 2 years 
3. 3 - 5 years 
4. 6 - 10 years 
5. 11-15 years 
6. 16 - 20 years 
7. 21 years or more 
Job Title: 
1. Nurse - ICU 
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2. Nurse - Floor 
3. Nurse - Administrator 
4. Resident - 1st year 
5. Resident - 2nd year or more 
6. Attending 
7. Administrator (non-Nurse) 
8. Respiratory Therapist 
9. Other 
Department: 
1. SICU 
2. CICC 
3. 5 Childrens 
4. 6 Childrens 
5. 7 Childrens 
6. PICU 
7. Newborn CC 
8. 4 AND North 
9. 5 Bedtower 
10. 5 East 
11. 5 West 
12. 6 NSH 
13. Burn Center - Pediatric 
14. ISCU 
15. 6 Bedtower 
16. 3 West 
17. Education 
 
Previous Rapid Response Team Experience (select all that apply) 
1. Experience with the Adult Rapid Response Team pilot at UNCH 
2. Experience with the Pediatric Rapid Response Team program at UNCH 
3. Experience with Rapid Response Teams at another hospital 
4. No experience with Rapid Response Teams 
5. Other 
Name: (optional) 
Would you like to add any comments? 
Do you want a summary of the information? If yes, provide your email address below or send a separate email 
to lisa_jc@unc.edu. 
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